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ABSTRACT: The idea of fairness is a recurrent one in international economic law and relations. By and 
large, however, commentators have failed to provide a structured understanding for this vital concept 
or explain its reflection in legal rules. This article proposes a theory of fairness as part of a broader 
theory of justice, suggesting that fairness is a part of justice, but not the whole of it. Rather, justice 
may be thought of as a combination of equality plus fairness (i.e. justice = equality + fairness), with 
the proviso that in any complex system of legal rules, equality must be greater than, or conceptually 
prior to, fairness (i.e. equality > fairness). Equality and fairness together constitute a “nested 
opposition” that legal rules constantly oscillate between. In the latter half of this article a look is taken 
at how these conceptual relationships are expressed in three regimes of international economic law: 
investment, trade and monetary affairs.   
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FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW AND RELATIONS 
 
By Chios Carmody1 
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1. Introduction 
 
*. What is fair and what role does fairness play in human affairs? These are substantial questions, 
questions of perennial concern. We often say that something is “fair” in the sense of it being fitting or 
appropriate, but how this idea is to be distinguished from other proximate ideas like equality or justice 
is unclear.2 Moreover, there seems to be an innate sense among human beings that the social 
arrangements and communities we live in should be “fair”, but again, what this aspiration means and 
how it is to be reconciled with the notions of fittingness or appropriateness mentioned above are 
uncertain. 
 
*. A very visible manifestation of these sentiments occurred in the fall of 2011 when protests 
organized under the banner of the Occupy Movement erupted in cities across the United States and 
around the world.3 The protesters’ demands were many and varied, but in the main they centered on 
the growth of income and social inequality during a time of uneven economic performance and 
intensifying competition. In one way or another, the protesters’ demands raised the issue of fairness. Is 
it fair for a small minority of the population in many countries to reap the benefits of recent economic 
growth?4 Have continuing waves of privatization – of schools, utilities and other regulated institutions 
– created “pools of privilege” that impede social mobility? So immediate and compelling are these 
questions that at least one candidate for the U.S. presidency in 2012 has made fairness a central plank 
of his platform.5 
 
*. Yet domestic politics and law are not the only venues for fairness queries and claims. Issues of 
fairness are constantly being raised in international law, and in international economic relations in 
                                                 
1 Associate Professor & Canadian National Director, Canada-United States Law Institute, Faculty of Law, University of Western 
Ontario, London, Ontario, Canada N6A 3K7. email: ccarmody@uwo.ca.  
2 “Fair … [f]ree from bias, fraud or injustice; equitable, legitimate.” J.A. Simpson & E.S.C. Weiner, The Oxford English Dictionary – 
Vol. V (2nd ed.) 671 (1989). Legal dictionaries offer a slightly different definitions. “Fair means … 1. impartial; just; equitable; 
disinterested; 2. Free from bias or prejudice …”. Blacks Law Dictionary (9th ed.) 674 (Brian Garner, ed.); “Fair means … reasonable”, 
Daphne Dukelow, The Dictionary of Canadian Law (4th ed.) 474 (2011). 
3 For a summary of the Movement’s themes and views see Janet Byrne (ed.), The Occupy Handbook (2012). 
4 In the United States, for instance, incomes of the top 1 percent of income earners grew 3.9 percent a year, capturing more than half of 
the overall economic growth experienced between 1993 and 2008. See Facundo Alvaredo, “Inequality over the Past Century”, 48:3 
Finance & Development 28 (Sept. 2011). The Economist has observed, “…within many countries income gaps have widened. More 
than two-third of the world’s people live in countries where income disparities have arisen since 1980, often to a startling degree. In 
America the share of national income going to the top 0.01% (some 16,000 families) has risen from just over 1% in 1980 to almost 5% 
now – an even bigger slice than the top 0.01% got in the Gilded Age.” “True Progressivism” 405 The Economist 8806 p. 13 (October 
13, 2012). 
5 See The White House, “Remarks on the Economy in Osawatomie, Kansas” (Dec. 6, 2011). For commentary see “The Election: The 
President Chooses his Ground” 950 The Economist (Dec. 10, 2011). Similar comments were made in the 2012 State of the Union 
Address where U.S. President Barack Obama mentioned “the basic American promise that if you worked hard, you could do well 
enough to raise a family, own a home, send your kids to college, and put a little away for retirement. … The defining issue of our time 
is how to keep that promise alive … We can either settle for a country where a shrinking number of people do really well while a 
growing number of Americans barely get by, or we can restore an economy where everyone gets a fair shot, and everyone does their 
fair share, and everyone plays by the same set of rules.” The White House, “The State of the Union Address” (Jan. 24, 2012) 
(emphasis added). 
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particular. During the 1960s, for instance, a “New International Economic Order” (NIEO) became a 
rallying cry for developing country governments and people who sought a more equitable division of 
the world’s resources, industry and wealth. The principal point of their advocacy was the perception 
that the then emerging system of global capitalism was unfair.6 Likewise, during the 1980s and 1990s 
a number of governments and commentators criticized the “Washington Consensus”, a set of policy 
prescriptions on privatization, debt reduction and public sector restraint.7 A key complaint was that the 
prescriptions were unrealistic and unfair. And in the late 2000s several Latin American countries 
withdrew from the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Centre for the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (ICSID), voicing the common concern that ICSID procedures for investment 
arbitration were one-sided and unfair.8 
 
*. Despite these claims, the question of the content of fairness and what role it plays in communal 
arrangements remains surprisingly open. Apart from underlying themes of inequality and subjectivity, 
few of the fairness claims outlined above appear to involve a common definition of the concept. 
Fairness seems to be mostly an intuitive matter: we know it when we see it. Not surprisingly, thinking 
about fairness in both international law and international economic law remains muddled and 
confused.9 
 
*. In 1995, for instance, Thomas Franck proposed that the central question in international law is 
whether or not international law is fair.10 Franck advanced this question without explaining why, as a 
preliminary matter, fairness, as opposed to equality or justice or any other value ordinarily spoken 
about in connection with international law, should merit pre-eminent consideration. After all, the 
traditional inquiry in law is not fairness, but justice, as is implicit from the appellation of the pre-
eminent tribunal of international law, the International Court of Justice. Similarly, in 2000 Steven 
Suranovic observed that “[t]he literature on fairness is diverse, multi-disciplinary, and often 
impenetrable”, but then seemed to add to that impenetrability by positing several different types of 
                                                 
6 Alexandra Diehl observes that “a new form of equity doctrine evolved when developing countries started to demand an NIEO. The 
call for this new economic order … took explicit form in three 1974 United Nations General Assembly resolutions which all contain 
references to equity … [The resolutions] all reflect[] a common understanding to define equity as a form of distributive justice – in 
other words an element of fairness.” Alexandra Diehl, The Core Standard of International Investment Protection: Fair and Equitable 
Treatment, pp. 318-319 (2012). 
7 The term Washington Consensus was coined in 1989 to describe a set of ten relatively specific economic policy prescriptions that he 
considered constituted the “standard” reform package promoted for crisis-wracked developing countries during the 1980s by 
Washington, D.C.-based institutions such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the U.S. Treasury Department. The 
prescriptions encompassed policies in such areas as macroeconomic stabilization, economic opening with respect to both trade and 
investment, and the expansion of market forces within the domestic economy. The term Washington Consensus has come to be used 
fairly widely in a second, broader sense, to refer to a more general orientation towards a strongly market-based approach to economic 
development. 
8 When the number of ICSID investment claims began to grow during the late 1990s, concern about the fairness and integrity of 
ICSID’s dispute settlement system began to increase. In May 2007 Bolivia withdrew from the Washington Convention and was 
followed by Ecuador in July 2009. In addition, in 2008 the Venezuelan Supreme Court issued an opinion limiting the extent of the 
country’s consent to submit to ICSID jurisdiction. All of the announcements of withdrawal or modification of consent echo traditional 
criticisms of the investor-state system of protection, but they can also be linked to recent waves of nationalization and expropriation 
undertaken in the region. Arguments raised by Latin American governments against ICSID are generally that ICSID awards are not 
subject to appeal, that the majority of ICSID disputes have been decided in favour of investors and therefore betray a lack of neutrality 
and impartiality, that claims under the treaty can only be launched by private investors (as opposed to states), and that the cost of 
arbitration is high. Debate now centers on the legal effect of the withdrawals: see Ignacio Vincentelli, “The Uncertain Future of ICSID 
in Latin America”, Electronic copy available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1348016 (2008); Antonios Tzanakopoulos, “Denunciation of 
the ICSID Convention under the General International Law of Treaties”, Electronic copy available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1735495 (2010) reprinted in Rainer Hofmann & Christian Tams (eds), International Investment Law and 
General International Law 75 (2011). 
9 For an index of recent literature on fairness see Andrew Brown & Robert Stern, “Concepts of Fairness in the Global Trading 
System” 12:3 Pacific Econ. Rev. 293, 318 (2007). See also Nicholas Rescher, Fairness: theory and practice of distributive justice 
(2002). 
10 Franck observed, “Like any maturing legal system, international law has entered into its post-ontological era … The questions to 
which the international lawyer must now be prepared to respond to … are different from the traditional inquiry: whether international 
law is law. Instead, we are now asked: is international law effective? Is it enforceable? Is it understood? And, the most important 
question: Is international law fair?” Thomas Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions 6 (1995). Many commentators 
subsequently picked up on this theme of fairness identified by Franck. For a critical appraisal see John Tasioulas, “International Law 
and the Limits of Fairness” 13:4 Eur. J. Int’l L. 993 (2002). 
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fairness.11 Suranovic concluded that while his scheme of classification helped to identify “the 
fundamental basis for normative arguments”, the inherent subjectivity of fairness meant “reasonable 
fairness principles will conflict when applied to a particular policy action”, leading to what he termed 
“a kind of ‘impossibility theorem’ … that there is no way to determine a set of objectively fair 
principles.”12 Likewise in 2006 Amrita Narlikar, writing about the fairness of international trade 
relations conducted under the auspices of the World Trade Organization (WTO), interpreted fairness 
to mean legitimacy of process and equity of outcomes and noted that there have been shifts in the 
attitudes of developing countries towards the institutional balance struck between these two concepts 
in the organization.13 Like Franck however, she did not explain why fairness is important as a 
substantive matter nor why it might be of concern to developing countries in the WTO. And in a 
contribution on the same subject by Andrew Brown and Robert Stern published in 2007, the authors 
concluded with the cautionary observation that “[a]ny attempt to define fairness in global trade 
relations should teach humility” and that “there is still no conclusive and incontrovertible way of 
assessing fairness.”14 
 
*. These many contributions and the myriad ways in which they approach the subject should 
demonstrate that there remains considerable uncertainty and confusion about the content and role of 
fairness. To develop a more systematic understanding, we appear to need a theory. A theory is a 
“system of ideas”15, with the emphasis being on the “system”, or set of relationships, regularly 
exhibited between those ideas.16 
 
*. In this article I develop a theory of fairness as part of a larger theory of justice. I suggest that 
fairness is a part of justice, but not the whole of it. Instead, drawing on recent insights from biology 
and evolutionary psychology, I suggest that rules about fairness in international economic law are a 
reflection of the fact that fairness is important to the formation of groups. A commitment to fairness is 
a community’s pledge that the community will be attentive to an individual’s particular concerns, 
needs or wants.17 In effect, the pledge is one of ‘appropriateness’ that helps to secure an individual’s 
participation in communal arrangements. Biologists and evolutionary psychologists have inferred 
from this that the pledge facilitates the division of labour and therefore contributes to the tremendous 
degree of sophistication observed in today’s global economy.18 
 
*. From this hypothesis I go on to suggest that we are chiefly interested in fairness as an indicator of 
relationships, relationships that, because of humans’ propensity towards interdependence, tend to 
promote the creation of the complex communities we live in and also allow for the remarkable feats of 
cooperation that occur within them such as organ donor schemes, futures markets and the internet.19 
                                                 
11 Suranovic identifes three types of equality fairness (non-discrimination fairness, distributional fairness, Golden-Rule fairness) and 
four types of reciprocity fairness (positive reciprocity fairness, negative reciprocity fairness, privacy fairness and maximum benefit 
fairness). However, he observes that “The concept itself overlaps with many other normative principles such as justice, equity, law 
and even morality. As such, one cannot simply pick up a book or article and quickly discover what fairness means or how to 
distinguish between the various normative principles. And yet, at the same time, everyone seems to have an inherent sense of what 
fairness is.” Steven Suranovic, “A Positive Analysis of Fairness with Applications to International Trade” 23:3 The World Economy 
283 (2000). 
12 Ibid., pp. 304-306. 
13 Amrita Narlikar, “Fairness in International Trade Negotiations” 29 The World Economy 1005 (2006). 
14 See supra, note 9, 316 (2007). 
15 S.v. “Theory”, Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (5th ed.) 3236 (2002). 
16 For a treatment of systems and systems theory see Donella Meadows, Thinking in Systems (2008). For an attempt to define the 
elements of a legal system see Joseph Raz, The Concept of a Legal System (1980). 
17 This is my abstraction of Joseph Henrich’s definition of fairness as “whatever combination of motivations and expectations yields 
more equal divisions.” Joseph Henrich et al., “Markets, Religion, Community Size, and the Evolution of Fairness and Punishment”, 
327 Science 1483 (19 March 2010) (emphasis added).  
18 “The efficiency of market exchange involving infrequent or anonymous interactions improves with an increasingly shared set of 
motivations and expectations related to trust, fairness and cooperation.” Ibid. at 1480 (emphasis added). 
19 “Although frequent and efficient exchanges among strangers are now commonplace, studies of nonhuman primates and small-scale 
societies suggest that during most of our evolutionary history, transactions beyond the local group, and certainly beyond the 
ethnolinguistic unit, were fraught with danger, mistrust, and exploitation. Thus, we propose that such “market norms” may have 
evolved as part of an overall process of societal evolution to sustain mutually beneficial exchanges in contexts where established 
social relationships (for example, kin, reciprocity, and status) were insufficient. If our theory is correct, then measures of fairness in 
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Fairness can be thought of as the minimum ‘price’ for such relationships to be sustained. 
 
*. At the same time, however, fairness is not everything. I further suggest that while traditional 
communities are heavily fairness-oriented, as they become larger and more complex, they search for a 
new metric appropriate to the growth of impersonal transactions, or in other words, transactions in 
which no continuing relationship is assumed. This comes about in the form of equality. 
 
*. Equality has long been the abstract ideal of a political community, but in modern life it assumes 
enhanced importance because individuals engage in episodic transactions with strangers to meet most 
of their daily needs.20 This impersonality, in turn, feeds a preoccupation in legal rules with the 
attainment of equality. However, the preoccupation can only be partly fulfilled since each instance of 
doing equality involves the impossible task of assessing identity and constitutes, in essence, a single 
instance of ‘fairness’.21 
 
*. Considered carefully, therefore, equality is largely an idealistic and aspirational value, one that 
contrasts with the realism and pragmatism of fairness. As we will see, equality and fairness constitute 
“nested oppositions” to each other, “that is, oppositions which also involve a relation of dependence, 
similarity, or containment between the opposed concepts.”22 Whereas equality is general, absolute and 
plenary, fairness is relational, conditional and exceptional. We can think of them and their associated 
characteristics as polarities between which the law constantly oscillates. The structure of legal rules in 
several different fields of international economic relations tends to bear this basic opposition out. 
 
*. Following this Introduction, therefore, Part 2 more fully develops a theory of fairness as part of a 
larger communitarian theory of justice. Part 3 goes on to examine how these ideas are exhibited and 
confirmed by practice in three different fields of international economic law – investment, trade and 
monetary affairs. Fairness considerations are a reflection of the particular ‘community’, or set of 
relationships, created under law in each field. Part 4 provides some concluding remarks about the 
relevance of fairness for international economic relations.  
 
2. The Concept and Role of Fairness 
 
*. The idea of fairness is elusive. As Americo Beviglia Zampetti observed in 2006: 
 
Fairness is a complex idea with a long history. As Woods put it, ‘very few ideas are 
very new’, and fairness is certainly not one of them. There is no accepted, uniform, 
and commonly shared definition of fairness. The notion is strongly associated with 
such ideas as equality, proportionality, reciprocity, equity, and justice, only to 
mention other terms that have found currency in the trade policy discourse. These 
concepts are entangled and their usage across disciplines and policy areas is far from 
univocal. But fairness, like justice, addresses issues that are fundamental to the social 
life of individuals as well as to nations.23        
                                                                                                                                                 
situations lacking relationship information (for example, anonymous others) should positively covary with market integration.” Ibid. 
20 Paul Seabright has written: “Homo sapiens sapiens is the only animal that engages in elaborate task-sharing – the division of labour 
as it is sometimes known – between genetically unrelated members of the same species. It is a phenomenon as remarkable and 
uniquely human as language itself. Most human beings now obtain a large share of the provision of their daily lives from others to 
whom they are not related by blood or marriage.” Paul Seabright, The Company of Strangers 1 (2004). 
21 This phenomenon of justice-as-fairness, or in other words, of justice conceived of as the doing of individual instances of fairness, is 
observed in transactional situations where “the marketplace balances out the various subjective perspectives of value by a large 
number of buyers and sellers.” In the process, subjective instances of value are ‘objectivized’. For mention of these ideas in 
connection with international investment law see Irmgard Marboe, Calculation of Compensation and Damages in International 
Investment Law, pp. 24-25 (2009). 
22 Jack Balkin, “Nested Oppositions”, 99 Yale L.J. 1669 (1990). Balkin went on to explain that a nested opposition is “a resituation of 
the opposition that allows us to see both difference and similarity, both conceptual distinction and conceptual dependence.” Ibid. at 
1671. 
23 Americo Bevigilia Zampetti, Fairness in the World Economy 26 (2006). Similarly, Steven Suranovic has written, “The concept 
itself overlaps with many other normative principles such as justice, equity, law and even morality. As such, one cannot simply pick 
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A similar lack of clarity about the definition of fairness is observed in international economic 
relations. Commentators often fail to provide a definition or simply assume its importance without 
explaining why it might be so fundamental. Given these qualifications, it is useful at the outset to 
examine the concept and role of fairness. 
 
*. In common English usage what is “fair” is considered to be fitting or appropriate to the 
circumstances.24 We say, for example, that a particular transaction is fair, meaning that it is suitable 
for all concerned. This is not, however, the same as saying that it is economically optimal. A fair 
transaction will simply be unobjectionable. 
 
*. This set of preliminary observations provides some initial insight about the content of fairness. 
First, fairness is a rough measure of what is socially acceptable. It may not satisfy every interest fully, 
but it is enough to preserve the relationships involved. Second, the use of fairness suggests that it is 
something which applies in particular situations as contrasted with general ones. Fairness is something 
that humans are chiefly concerned with as an attribute of their continuing relationships. Instinct tells 
us that it would make a poor rule for human behaviour as a whole. Third, fairness is not equality (i.e. 
fairness ≠ equality). The plain difference in terminology emphasizes the fact that there is a clear 
distinction between the two concepts.25 Instead, fairness can be thought of as inequality, although as 
we will see, it is inequality of a special type. 
 
*. These preliminary observations invite controversy and need to be tested against a range of usages 
and practice in order to be confirmed. Research results from science can help. Since 2000 there has 
been considerable scientific research into the origins and nature of fairness.26 Both biologists and 
evolutionary psychologists have sought to determine the origins and contribution of fairness to human 
relations. 
 
*. The research reveals that fairness is a uniquely human trait. It is something that is not observed in 
our closest genetic relative, the chimpanzee.27 Looking at the way species have evolved differently, 
biologists and evolutionary psychologists have hypothesized that fairness is vital to human interaction, 
and in particular, to the formation of groups. These are not just small-scale groups, such as families, 
kinship assemblies and associations, where individuals are likely to know each other intimately and 
where, in particular, they are likely to discount or revalue their transactions in the expectation of a 
continuing relationship, but also include larger, more complex forms of human affiliation where 
personal connections are effectively lost and where, as Joseph Henrich has recently pointed out, 
substitutive social mechanisms such as religion, education and esteem for altruistic behaviour all 
contribute to reinforce the wider communal sense of fairness.28 
                                                                                                                                                 
up a book or article and quickly discover what fairness means or how to distinguish between the various normative principles. And 
yet, at the same time, everyone seems to have an inherent sense of what fairness is.” Steven Suranovic, “A Positive Analysis of 
Fairness with Applications to International Trade” 23(3) The World Economy 283 (2000). 
24 See definitions provided supra, note 2. 
25 Confirmation of this point comes from common definitions, which do not always equate fairness with equality. Instead, they tend to 
suggest that fairness plays a supplementary role in attaining equality. For example, Ioana Tudor observes, “the common understanding 
given to fair treatment is that of right and reasonable treatment that sometimes may achieve equality between the parties, although this 
is not always the case.” Ioana Tudor, The Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in the International Law of Foreign Investment 126 
(2008) (emphasis added). Joseph Henrich refers to behavioural fairness as “whatever combination of motivations and expectations 
yields more equal divisions”. Joseph Henrich et al., “Markets, Religion, Community Size, and the Evolution of Fairness and 
Punishment”, 327 Science 1483 (19 March 2010) (emphasis added). “Fairness relates to (but does not identify with) the propriety of 
distribution between burdens and benefits. Just outcomes are generally those that flow from fair processes. A ‘fair trade’ (as a ‘fair 
fight’) is one conducted under roughly equal conditions.” Americo Beviglia-Zampetti, Fairness in the World Economy 27 (2003).  
26 Ernst Fehr & Simon Gächter, “Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity” 14:3 Journal of Economic Perspectives 159 
(Summer 2000); Joseph Henrich et al., “Markets, Religion, Community Size, and the Evolution of Fairness and Punishment”, 327 
Science 1480 (19 March 2010) [hereinafter Henrich]. See supporting references in T.C. Burnham et al., 27 Anal. Kritik 113 (2005); 
M.A. Nowak et al, 289 Science 1773 (2000). See also Karla Hoff, “Fairness in Modern Society” 327 Science 1467-68 (19 Mar. 2010); 
George Akerlof & Robert Schiller, Animal Spirits pp. 19-26 (2010). 
27 “Evolution: Patience, Fairness and the Human Condition” 950 The Economist 67 (6 Oct. 2007). 
28 See Henrich, supra note 26. 
 Fairness in International Economic Law Draft SSRN.doc 
6 
 
*. If these findings are accepted, then it becomes apparent that fairness is important both at an 
individual and a communal level because it is part of a successful evolutionary strategy. In essence, 
fairness has allowed complex human communities to arise. Many transactions we engage in as 
humans require us to forego the satisfaction of immediate reciprocation. The guarantee of fairness in 
these situations – not exact reciprocation, but reciprocation of an approximate type, usually over time 
– encourages the maintenance and intensification of relationships by affording individuals the security 
of knowing that at least some their interests will be taken into account. This security encourages 
participation in communal arrangements. 
 
*. This conclusion, in turn, yields two further observations. The first is that a degree of fairness 
implies a community.29 Thomas Franck defined a community as follows: 
 
A community is based, first, on a common, conscious system of reciprocity between 
its constituents and this system of reciprocity conduces to a fairness dialogue. This is 
because a perception of the fairness of any particular rule depends, in major part, on 
its implicit promise to treat like with like. In order to achieve the expectations that 
the rule in any one instance will also be the rule in other comparable instances, there 
must be an underlying assumption of an ongoing, structured relationship between a 
set of actors: in other words, a community.30  
 
*. Franck’s description of a community arising from a “fairness dialogue” is a useful reference in the 
sense that it highlights how fairness concerns arise within relationships and become part of communal 
concern. However, his description may place undue emphasis on the idea of an “implicit promise to 
treat like with like” since any set of relationships, or community, will inevitably involve reciprocation 
over time. This reciprocation will only be approximate, and indeed, in the closest, most enduring 
relationships, it is likely to be unequal. For this reason, the idea of “like with like” only imperfectly 
captures what transpires under the rubric of “community”.     
 
*. Therefore, a second observation related to the first has to with the convergence between the view of 
fairness put forward above and recent developments in economics. These suggest that individuals are 
not purely rational maximizers. In other words, they do not seek to satisfy their own immediate 
interests, at least not all the time, as economists have long assumed.31 Rather, the behaviour of 
individuals will be calculated to uphold the relationships that are vital to their long-term well-being, 
something which may require significant discounting or revaluation as the circumstances require and 
which naturally gives rise to considerations of fairness. There is, therefore, an important element of 
diffuse and unequal reciprocity in human behaviour. 
 
*. But if fairness is so important and if it has played such a critical role in our evolution as a species, 
why are communities – including the international community - not entirely fairness-based. Why is 
the central question we are so often confronted with in international law not the one that Franck posed 
– “is international law fair?”32 – but a different one, “is international law just?” A number of 
commentators have observed that fairness cannot serve as a basis for all law, otherwise the law risks 
becoming purely political.33 Another reason is that the doing of fairness is variable and therefore tends 
                                                 
29 On the relevance of community see Michael Sandel, Law and the Limits of Liberalism 172-75 (1998). For a look at what makes a 
community see Peter Block, Community: the structure of belonging (2009). 
30 Thomas Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions 10 (1995). 
31 For re-evaluations of econometric analysis of law see Richard Posner, The Failure of Capitalism (2009); Richard Posner, The Crisis 
of Capitalist Democracy (2010). Nicola De Luca, “Unequal Treatment and Shareholders’ Welfare Growth: ‘Fairness’ v. ‘Precise 
Equality’ 34:3 Delaware J. Corp. L. (2009) (arguing that a strong or rather mechanical equal treatment rule in share repurchases, 
distributions in kind, or capital reductions is not efficient; an economic analysis of the law shows that disparate treatment of 
shareholders may increase shareholders’ overall welfare). 
32 Thomas Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions 7 (1995). 
33 “The distinctive features of justice and their special connection with law begin to emerge  if it is observed that most of the criticisms 
made in terms of just and unjust could almost equally well be conveyed by the words ‘fair’ and ‘unfair’. Fairness is plainly not 
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to erode stability and predictability. In addition, no community will have the luxury of meeting all 
claims to fairness. This is because individuals are endlessly different and while sharing the common 
fact of their humanness, they constantly confront different circumstances. For this reason, not all 
interests in the form of human needs, wants or desires can be satisfied. As we will see, the ‘doing’ of 
fairness imposes a social ‘cost’ in terms of different logic, rules and requirements. It is not free. 
Decision-makers must therefore weigh the expense of “doing” fairness in a particular situation against 
its wider value in reinforcing the sense of communal affiliation.34 
 
*. The limitations of fairness suggest that in a complex community – a community where the majority 
of transactions are impersonal, that is, conducted with strangers with whom we have no regular 
relationship – another value becomes important. This is the value of equality. Still, equality presents 
challenges of its own largely because it is impossible for the operation of justice to be completely 
identical, and in fact, most people in most situations will be content to accept somewhat less or more 
than they have received in recognition of an ongoing relationship requiring reciprocation in future. 
Hence, the doing of ‘equality’ in specific instances is not the same as identity (i.e. equality ≠ identity) 
but more akin to fairness. This reproduction of opposites is, in fact, an aspect of their “nested 
opposition”. 
 
*. The conclusions above can be distilled into a set of relationships that may be expressed as follows: 
 
Justice = Equality + Fairness 
 
This equation has the advantage of replicating the definition of justice given by a number of legal 
theorists.35 The biological and evolutionary theory set out above, however, also infers that this basic 
relationship is accompanied by an important proviso: 
 
Equality > Fairness 
 
*. The proviso stems from the fact that in any complex community the value of equality must exert a 
                                                                                                                                                 
coextensive with morality in general; references to it are mainly relevant in two situations in social life. One is when we are concerned 
not with a single individual’s conduct but with the way in which classes of individuals are treated, when some burden or benefit falls 
to be distributed among them. Hence what is typically fair or unfair is a ‘share’. The second situation is when some injury has been 
done and compensation or redress is claimed.” H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (2nd ed.) 158 (1997). “Conflicts among ideals are 
common in politics. Even if we rejected integrity and based our political activity only on fairness, justice, and procedural due process, 
we would find the first two virtues sometimes pulling in the opposite direction. Some philosophers deny the possibility of any 
fundamental conflict between justice and fairness because they believe that one of these virtues in the end derives from the other. 
Some say that justice has no meaning apart from fairness, that in politics, as in roulette, whatever happens through fair procedures is 
just. That is the extreme of the idea called justice as fairness. Others think that the only test of fairness in politics is the test of result, 
that no procedure is fair unless it is likely to produce political decisions that meet some independent test of justice. That is the opposite 
extreme, of fairness as justice. Most political philosophers – and I think most people – take the intermediate view that fairness and 
justice are to some degree independent of one another, so that fair institutions sometimes produce unjust decisions and unfair 
institutions just ones.” Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire 177 (1986). 
34 Herbert Hart referred to this idea of a limit to the “cost” of enforcement in the following terms: “In civil cases, a similar conflict 
between justice and the general good is resolved in favour of the latter, when the law provides no remedy for some moral wrong 
because to enforce compensation in such cases might involve great difficulties of proof or overburden the courts, or unduly hamper 
enterprise. There is a limit to the amount of law enforcement which any society can afford, even when a moral wrong has been done.” 
H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (2nd ed.), p. 166 (1997). There are, of course, some troubling conclusions to the theory of justice and 
fairness put forward here. A community’s resources will be devoted to satisfying certain claims at the expense of others, something 
which inevitably gives rise to the conclusion that any community will be, in some way, residually unjust. In this respect, two further 
observations can be made. First, as mentioned, fairness is just, but not all justice is fair. The explanation for this paradox lies in the 
fact that in a sustainable community justice will be composed of equality and fairness, but there will be some instances where what is 
just is not fair. This ‘residual’ unfairness may be a stimulus to communal reform, re-organization or, in certain circumstances, to a 
radical reformation of the community in the form of revolution, secession or dismemberment. A second conclusion is that communal 
arrangements reflective of justice will be oriented in a certain way: towards equality and away from fairness. This means that equality 
will have a certain idealistic and attractive character, something that involves its identification with the future and what will be. 
35 Sanne Taekema observes that “[t]he combination of fairness and equality at the core of the concept of justice is also propagated by 
Neil MacCormick (1978, 73). Fairness as the core of justice is proposed e.g., by David Miller (1976). Justice as equal treatment can 
also be found in – apart from Radbruch (1932, 278) Hart (1994, 159), Harris (1996, 171), and Aristotle (1934 Nicomachean Ethics).” 
Sanne Taekema, The Concept of Ideals in Legal Theory, 192, n. 31 (2003). 
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degree of conceptual priority, or ‘pull’, reflecting the fact that the foundation of any community lies in 
the application of equal rules to all. Only exceptionally are variable rules, that is, rules tailored to 
specific circumstances in the form of ‘fairness’, called for. 
 
*. A critical eye might object to what I have just put forward by pointing out that whole empires have 
flourished without much idea of equality, at least in a political sense. Sophisticated political structures 
have been built and sustained for long periods by many impersonal transactions, and hence, the theory 
that I am asserting is questionable. I recognize this objection, but I also maintain that the theory must 
be understood in light of contemporary conceptions of equality and fairness which give an ever 
greater force to the egalitarian impulse (i.e. equality > fairness). Much of the last three hundred years 
in human history has been devoted to the sweeping away of political structures that, in their earliest 
phases, must have been based on fairness and replacing them with structures based on ideas of 
equality. They are a manifestation of the ever more abstract and complex communities we live in, 
including the international economic community.       
 
*. To summarize, I take a particular view of the concept and role of fairness. Many commentators 
have had difficulty in defining and identifying what fairness involves and what role it plays, a 
difficulty I would attribute to the inherent variability of fairness as well as to accreted layers of 
terminologic and conceptual confusion. Fairness is a subjective value and that subjectivity frequently 
obscures its definition. I see fairness as playing a certain role in human relations and as part of the idea 
of justice. It is a necessary attribute of successful relationships and involves a degree of discounting or 
revaluation in recognition of their maintenance. It might be termed “the justice of particular 
circumstances”. Because fairness is relational, it usually implies a departure from equality. It is 
inequality for the purpose of sustaining relationships, and therefore in a wider sense, community. 
However, fairness cannot constitute the basis for all legal rules due to its cost and the need for 
predictability. The law must be legal, not purely political. Thus, while a general statement of justice 
might be that justice involves a combination of equality and fairness, in any reasonably complex legal 
system the law will prioritize equality such that fairness becomes a secondary and supplementary 
value in the greater task of attaining of equality. Likewise, a legal system giving expression to justice 
is likely to display its own combination of equality and fairness.36 
 
3. Fairness in International Economic Law 
 
*. In this section I take a look at how the foregoing theory of fairness is reflected in the shape of legal 
rules concerning international economic relations. I pursue this examination by analyzing how fairness 
references and claims are dealt with in terms of equality, rights and proportionality in three areas of 
international economic law – investment, trade and monetary affairs. 
 
*. I begin the examination in each section of this Part by considering how fairness references are set 
up against equality in each area. This examination involves consideration of what it is that the law in 
the area deems to be equal and how fairness, or appropriateness, is shaped in response to this legal 
priority. Next, I examine how fairness is largely rights-based and is often preoccupied with the 
particular. For this reason, there are fine limits to what is recognized as fair or appropriate, an aspect 
of fairness’ ‘cost’. Finally, as a reflection of this orientation, I examine the law’s concern with 
proportionality in meeting fairness claims. Fairness is measured proportionately, that is, in proportion 
to its contribution to reinforcing the legal system, and hence, to the community as a whole. 
Proportionality can also be thought of as a form of ‘equality’, that is, as an amount equal to the wider 
notional importance of the proportion. This reality is but a further manifestation of the fact that 
                                                 
36 My ideas about equality and fairness, and therefore justice, bear resemblance to those of Michael Walzer. However, Walzer argues 
that the criteria of justice should be discerned from analysis of how social goods are actually distributed as opposed to their 
distribution by some process of abstract reasoning. See Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice (1983). I go beyond Walzer to suggest that 
more recent research and abstract reasoning can help to identify a standard typology of justice that involves a combination of equality 
and fairness. 
 Fairness in International Economic Law Draft SSRN.doc 
9 
equality and fairness together form a “nested opposition”. 
 
*. The concept of nested opposition was identified by Jack Balkin in 1990 to define “oppositions 
which also involve a relation of dependence, similarity, or containment between the opposed 
concepts.”37 Balkin defined the concept further as follows: 
 
A nested opposition is a conceptual opposition each of whose terms contains the 
other, or each of whose terms shares something with the other. The metaphor of 
“containing” one’s opposite actually stands as a proxy for a number of related 
concepts - similarity to the opposite, overlap with the opposite, being a special case 
of the opposite, conceptual or historical dependence upon the opposite, and 
reproduction of the opposite or transformation into the opposite over time.38 
 
*. What nested opposition stresses are deconstructionist ideas of ‘differance’ and ‘trace’. ‘Differance’ 
was the term of art used by Jacques Derrida to describe the mutual dependence and differentiation of 
concepts. ‘Trace’ is the retention of absent concepts that remain present in the understanding of other 
concepts. Differance and trace are relevant in deconstructionist analysis, which aims to show “to show 
that the favored or dominant term bears some form of conceptual dependence to the disfavored or 
subordinated term.”39  
 
*. Applying these ideas to international economic relations, we will observe a conceptual dependence 
between equality and fairness in all three of the areas of international economic law. This conceptual 
dependence emphasizes the primacy of equality and the subordination of fairness. Equality is the 
dominant concept, which is generalized and plenary. It is the ‘default’ to which law generally adheres. 
Fairness, by comparison, is the “disfavoured” or “subordinated” concept. It is the exception, 
something which legal rules reproduce irregularly.  
 
*. In line with their character as a nested opposition, however, equality and fairness rules relate to 
each other symbiotically. If the law is not doing equality, it must be doing fairness, and vice versa. 
What is perhaps most intriguing is the possibility of “reproduction”, or “transformation”, between the 
nested opposites. As will be seen, the actual ‘doing’ of equality becomes fairness in each momentary 
instance. Likewise, the ‘doing’ of fairness becomes our best estimate of what equality looks like over 
time. Together, the two values exhibit a relationship - a relationship that varies according to the 
community within which it takes shape and which is commonly conceived of under the rubric of 
‘justice’. 
 
a. International Investment Law 
 
*. International investment law is that branch of international law which deals with the regulation of 
state behaviour vis-à-vis foreign investors and their investments in foreign countries. The law in the 
area has emerged out of a two-fold concern, one for the taking of property, the other for the protection 
of aliens. Today it is sourced in both customary international law and in a dense network of almost 
3,000 bilateral, regional and multilateral treaties.40 Many of these treaties are similar, featuring similar 
language, provisions and causes of action, but a number also reveal variations that reflect subtle 
differences in relations between signatory states. The resulting legal framework of international 
investment protection is therefore highly uneven. 
 
                                                 
37 Jack Balkin, “Nested Oppositions” 99 Yale L.J. 1669 at 1671 (1990). 
38 Ibid., at 1676. 
39 Ibid. 
40 “As a result of the surge in treaty-making undertaken by states since the end of World War II, the total number of treaties with 
meaningful provisions relating to foreign investment as of the beginning of 2009 probably exceeded 3,000.” Jeswald Salacuse, The 
Law of Investment Treaties 2 (2010). 
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*. The focus of this framework is overwhelmingly on investor protection. The ‘equality’ in question is 
the value of the investment or some proxy thereof. In essence, the law emphasizes the protection and 
vindication of the investor’s rights to equal recovery, although as we will see, this ‘equality’ is highly 
variable and, consistent with the theory laid out above, can be thought of in each momentary 
assessment as ‘fairness’. The theory suggests that because of this orientation, international investment 
law should be replete with instances of fairness – as indeed we will see it is.  
 
*. Under most bilateral investment treaties (BITs) foreign investors have three classic bases of claim:  
 
i) expropriation 
ii) a breach of international law 
iii) a breach of private law.  
 
These bases of claim are accompanied by standards of treatment. Historically, the taking of property 
came to be regulated by international law relating to expropriation, legal and illegal takings, whereas 
rules relating to the treatment of aliens, which initially emphasized the physical treatment of the alien 
as a person, subsequently evolved to focus somewhat more broadly on the alien as an economic actor. 
 
*. It is within this second category of legal regulation – the treatment of aliens – that a need originally 
arose to define an international minimum standard of treatment (MST), and ultimately, consideration 
of what was “fair”. The MST was conceived of as a way of sidestepping the pitfalls of a purely 
national standard. The initial articulation of the standard is commonly traced to the Neer case of 1926, 
where one commissioner opined that the acts complained of “… should amount to an outrage, to bad 
faith, to wilful neglect of duty, or to an insufficiency of governmental action so far short of 
international standards that every reasonable and impartial man would readily recognize its 
insufficiency.”41 The Neer and other early formulations of the MST were considered to be restrictive 
and over time gave rise to less onerous ones. Nevertheless, what the various formulations of an MST 
emphasize is the independent development of the standard by arbitral tribunals. Their methods of 
interpretation have, moreover, meant a flexible MST standard, one which remains unclear at the 
margins. As Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah observes, “The content of the international minimum 
standard, when it comes to investment protection, will always be problematic … One knows that there 
is such a standard but what that standard contains and what its modern limits are, are unclear.”42 
 
*. The formulation of such a variable standard in the form of a concrete cause of action for investors 
seeking remedies for injury has proven to be particularly problematic because of the perceived need to 
reference pre-existing customary sources of protection. For a violation of the MST to be made out “a 
specific rule or pre-existing customary international law must be shown to have been violated.”43 In 
some cases, as Sornarajah points out, no such rule or law could be identified. For this reason treaty 
references to a “fair and equitable standard of treatment” (FET) have become important in recent 
decades and now constitute the basis for an additional cause of action separate and apart from that of 
the MST, although there remains substantial debate over whether FET simply duplicates, overlaps, or 
provides something additional to, the MST.44 
 
*. References to “fair and equitable treatment” first appeared in U.S. treaties of friendship, commerce 
and navigation (FCN treaties) in the 1950s and were later repeated in German and Swiss investment 
                                                 
41 United Nations, Reports of International Arbitral Awards, 1926, IV, pp. 60ff. 
42 Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah, The International Law on Foreign Investment (2nd ed.) 329 (2004). 
43 Ibid., p. 332. 
44 “Many scholars and non-NAFTA tribunals have concluded that the fair and equitable standard, when expressed without 
qualification or condition, is an autonomous, additional standard whose scope is not limited by the minimum standards required by 
international law. According to this view, the fair and equitable clause imposes a higher standard of treatment on host states than 
customary international law does.” Jeswald Salacuse, The Law of Investment Treaties 226 (2010). 
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treaties in the late 1960s.45 Subsequently, they became much more frequent, with one commentator 
estimating in 2007 that references to an FET standard appear in approximately 360 treaties.46 
However, it is only in the last 15 years that FET-related claims have been regularly made.47  
 
*. FET is frequently described as an “absolute” standard or obligation, that is, something distinct from 
MST or other investment-treaty causes of action premised on relative comparisons with minimal or 
average behaviour.48 Over time FET has also evolved into a residual obligation, “available to redress 
breaches that the more specifically defined obligations of national treatment, most favoured national 
treatment, performance requirements or expropriation might not remedy, but where the interest in 
question is still worthy of investor protection.”49   
 
*. Nevertheless, as a substantive matter the standard itself is famously opaque, recalling the inherent 
subjectivity of “fairness”. Thus, Jeswald Salacuse states that “the term ‘fair and equitable’ is, one may 
say without exaggeration, maddeningly vague, frustratingly general, and treacherously elastic”50, 
Roland Kläger describes it as “quite controversial in times of rapidly growing arbitral case law”51 and 
Meg Kinnear notes that “the FET standard continues to defy precise definition.”52 Still, FET claims 
are enormously important today. Kinnear observes, for instance, that “FET is the most frequently 
pleaded obligation in international investment arbitration.”53 
 
*. The reason for its importance lies in the nature of international investment law. To begin with, 
international investment treaties have been described as “hybrid”. In most instances countries 
conclude investment treaties between themselves on a bilateral basis with the ultimate aim of 
protecting their nationals who invest abroad. Thus, the benefit of these arrangements appears to flow 
to individual investors, who have been likened to “third party beneficiaries” under contract law.54 This 
predisposes the law towards individuality and subjectivity. 
 
*. At the same time, the bare characterization of investors as beneficiaries is misrepresentative. If 
fairness involves the maintenance of relationships and the sustaining of community, it appears 
counterintuitive to allow claims for “fair and equitable treatment” in the context of litigation where the 
relationship in question – normally an investment – has irretrievably broken down and is unlikely to 
be re-established. How can the examples referred to here be indicative of fairness’ ability to protect 
and promote relationships? A certain paradox appears until it is recognized that the perspective of 
investment litigation is generally retrospective and therefore raises the question, what should have 
been done to re-create the relationship at some particular time in the past? There is, in addition, the 
question of secondary effects. Most modern investment treaties are concluded with a view to 
facilitating the flow of investment prospectively or going forward. An obligation of fairness confirmed 
by an arbitrator in one instance will have a positive effect on the general investment climate in others. 
                                                 
45 An OECD Study Paper on FET published in 2004 observed that ““US FCN treaties with Ireland (1950), Greece (1954), Israel 
(1954), France (1960), Pakistan (1961), Belgium (1963) and Luxembourg (1963), contained the express assurance that foreign 
persons, properties, enterprises and other interests would receive “equitable treatment” while others including those with the Federal 
Republic of Germany, Ethiopia and the Netherlands used the terms “fair and equitable treatment” for a similar set of items involved in 
the foreign investment process.” 
46 Ioana Tudor, The Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in the International Law of Foreign Investment ix (2008) [hereinafter 
Tudor].  
47 Ibid., p. 15. 
48 On FET having a non-contingent character Tudor notes “While other clauses were contingent upon an initial treatment or situation 
established by the host State, the FET standard was absolute, dependent exclusively on international law, and therefore imposing on 
host States an obligation they could not model according to their own capacities.” Ibid., p. 2. 
49 Meg Kinnear, “The Continuing Development of the Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard”, Andrea Bjorklund et al. (eds.), 
Investment Treaty Law – Current Issues 237 (2009) [hereinafter Kinnear]. 
50 Jeswald Salacuse, The Law of Investment Treaties 221 (2010). 
51 Roland Kläger, “‘Fair and Equitable Treatment’ and Sustainable Development” in Marie-Claire Cordonier Segger et al. (eds.), 
Sustainable Development in World Investment Law 241, 243 (2011).    
52 See Kinnear, supra note 49 at 209.  
53 Ibid. 
54 Alexandra Diehl, The Core Standard of International Investment Protection: Fair and Equitable Treatment, p. 310 (2012) 
[hereinafter Diehl]. 
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There is also the relationship between signatory states to consider. 
 
*. Nevertheless, the character of relationships in investment law is one-sided in the sense that 
investment treaties are meant to protect individual investors and investments as opposed to the states 
that they operate in. There is, therefore, diminished concern with the behaviour of the investor in FET 
claims.55 The law’s concern with fairness is not reciprocal.   
 
*. A specific investment relationship provides a natural environment for the individualization of the 
law mentioned above. It is hardly surprising that within this particularized set of circumstances claims 
to “fair and equitable treatment” have flourished. Case after case in which FET claims have been 
considered stress the highly subjective nature of fairness analyzed under the standard. Tribunals have 
repeatedly stressed that a judgment of what is fair and equitable cannot be reached in the 
abstract. It will always depend on the specific circumstances. Thus, for instance, “[i]n Waste 
Management, the tribunal interpreting the standard held that ‘the standard is to some extent a flexible 
one which must be adapted to the circumstances of each case.”56  
 
*. In examining the law in this area, it becomes clear that definitions of fairness used by tribunals and 
commentators accord with the idea of “appropriateness” contained in the theory above. In most 
instances there appears to be a shade of distinction maintained between “fairness” and cognate 
concepts of “justice” or “equality”. Thus, in MTD Equity v. Chile57 the tribunal observed: 
 
… in their ordinary meaning, the terms ‘fair’ and ‘equitable’ … mean ‘just’, ‘even-
handed’, ‘unbiased’, ‘legitimate’. 
 
There are, however, limitations to a purely textual approach and commentators in search of a 
definition of FET have tended to focus on what particular standard it provides substantively - whether 
equal to, overlapping, or different from the MST - rather than its bare meaning per se.58 Meg Kinnear 
has also observed that “[d]ictionary definitions of the terms ‘fair’ or ‘equitable’ tend to be circular, 
and the meaning of ‘fair and equitable’ may well be in the eye of the beholder.”59  
 
*. In addition, there are fine limits to investment law’s subjectivity and hence to its fairness. This is 
particularly apparent in relation to the interpretation by arbitrators of investors’ “reasonable 
expectations”. Kinnear notes, for instance, that “[t]he most significant development in recent FET 
cases has been the tendency of awards to go beyond a mere invocation of the mantra that legitimate 
                                                 
55 “The legal obligation of the host State to treat foreign Investors fairly and equitably is a unilateral obligation and does not place the 
Investor in a reciprocal relationship in which he would assume a corresponding obligation.” Tudor, supra note 46 at p. 236. 
56 Tudor, supra note 46 at p. 130. See also CME Czech Republic B.V. v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL (The Netherlands/Czech 
Republic BIT) Partial Award 13 September 2001, para 336; Mondev v. United States, para 118; Petrobart v. Kyrgyz Republic, 
Stockholm Chamber Case No. 126/2003 (Energy Charter) Final Award, 29 March 2005, para 26; Noble Ventures v. Romania (ICSID 
Case No. ARB/01/11) Award 12 October 2005, para 181; MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd. & MTD Chile S.A. v. Chile (Republic of) (ICSID 
Case No. ARB/01/7) (Malaysia/Chile BIT), Award 25 May 2004, para 109; ADC Affiliate Limited and ADC & ADMC Management 
Limited v. Hungary (The Republic of) (ICSID Case No. ARB/03/16) (Hungary/Cyprus BIT) Award 2 October 2006, para 44; Waste 
Management v. Mexico, para 99 cited in GAMI Investments v. Mexico, para 96. Commentators agree. Pierre-Marie Dupuy has referred 
to FET as “a benchmark for identifying a rule and the rule itself as it is established by taking into account every pertinent element of 
fact and law to be selected out of the complex relationship existing at a certain time between the investor and the host State.” Quoted 
in Tudor, supra note 46 at p. vi. Tudor notes that “[i]t is the subjective element of the standard that illustrates best its ability to cover 
and extensive list of hypotheses through its ‘open-ended’ nature. The variety of facts and circumstances to which the standard is 
applied speak for themselves.” Similarly, Alexandra Diehl observes that, “[i]nvestment standards like the FET standard can thus be 
described as factually based yardsticks that measure the conformity of a State’s action with international law. Being a ‘factually based 
yardstick’, the FET standard naturally has to be described in terms of fact patterns.” Diehl, supra note 54, at p. 329. 
57 ICSID Case No. ARB/01/07 Award (25 May 2004). 
58 It is useful to remember, however, that references to a FET standard in international investment law refer to “fair and equitable”, 
meaning that in virtually every instance the definition of fairness and equity coexist and must be interpreted jointly. What they have 
become, in essence, is a term of art. Credence was given to this idea by Judge Higgins in the Oil Platforms (Iran v. United States) 
case, where she observed ““The key terms ‘fair and equitable treatment to nationals and companies’ and ‘unreasonable and 
discriminatory measures’ are legal terms of art well known in the field of overseas investment protection …” [1996] I.C.J. 803 
(Preliminary Objection) (emphasis added). 
59 See Kinnear, supra note 49 at 215. 
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expectations must be met by undertaking a more detailed analysis of the nature of a legitimate 
expectation.”60 This has involved tying expectations to pre-investment conditions, the specificity of, 
and reliance upon, offers, the ultimate objectivity of expectations, and the expectation that the host 
state will maintain a stable business environment.61 Tribunals have demonstrated an awareness that 
“fair and equitable” claims – as claims that are inherently subjective - must have an objective basis in 
order to be properly adjudicated upon.62 
 
*. Another limitation upon FET claims is the idea of proportionality. Proportionality is the legal 
principle that all exercises of power must take place in relation to the aim sought to be achieved. In the 
investment law context, the requirement has been interpreted by some tribunals to mandate a 
balancing of the investor’s rights against the ultimate purpose of official action. Hence in Saluka v. 
Czech Republic63 the tribunal determined that a government has the right to regulate its banking sector 
to promote stability. An investor could not reasonably expect the regulatory environment to remain 
entirely fixed and static as at the time that its investment was made: 
 
In particular, any differential treatment of a foreign investor must not be based on 
unreasonable distinctions and demands, and must be justified by showing that it 
bears a reasonable relationship to rational policies not motivated by a preference for 
other investments over the foreign-owned investment.64 
 
*. Another domain where considerations of fairness rise to the fore in international investment law is 
in relation to valuation, that is, the valuation of a particular investment by arbitral tribunals. In 
valuation, the investor’s rights are given actual expression. This is where the best estimate of the value 
of the breached right is arrived at. To recall, international investment law classically recognizes three 
bases of claim: expropriation, breach of international law and breach of private law. We will see how 
with respect to each of these bases the ideal of equality - conceived of as “full reparation” - gives way 
in practice to the reality of fairness. 
 
*. First, with respect to expropriation, it is generally recognized that a state has a presumptive right to 
expropriate. The state’s act in this instance is not regarded as illegal. However upon expropriation, 
compensation is due. It might be thought that applicable standard of compensation in this instance is 
one of full repair. Thus, in the Lusitania case the German-American Claims Comission observed that: 
 
It is a general rule of both the civil and the common law that every invasion of a 
private right imports an injury and that for every such injury the law gives a remedy. 
Speaking generally, that remedy must be commensurate with the injury received.65 
 
Nevertheless, general statements of the law and state practice have not adhered to this view. Instead, 
the most generally accepted formula with respect to compensation upon expropriation is the Hull 
Formula of 1938 which describes the relevant obligation being “to make adequate, effective and 
prompt compensation”. This is not identical to the principle of full reparation. 
 
*. Further support for this view of ‘equality-as-fairness’ comes from the practice of the U.S. and other 
capital exporting countries. For instance, Art. 6 of the 2012 Model U.S. bilateral investment treaty on 
‘Expropriation and Compensation’ reads: 
 
                                                 
60 Ibid., p. 226. 
61 Ibid., pp. 226-236. 
62 “FET cases have also begun to explore the reasonableness of the investor’s expectations. Given that FET is an objective standard, a 
tribunal should consider whether in all the circumstances the State acted reasonably. The subjective views of the investor do not 
govern whether the treatment meets the FET standard.” Ibid., pp. 230.  
63 Saluka Investments B.V. v. Czech Republic, Partial Award (2006). 
64 Ibid., para. 307. 
65 Cited in Irmgard Marboe, Calculation of Compensation and Damages in International Investment Law p. 16, para. 2.32 (2009).  
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The compensation referred to … shall: (a) be paid without delay; (b) be equivalent to 
the fair market value of the expropriated investment immediately before the 
expropriation took place (“the date of expropriation”); (c) not reflect any change in 
value occurring because the intended expropriation had become known earlier; and 
(d) be fully realizable and freely transferable. 
 
The language of other modern model BITs concluded by industrialized countries are similarly 
worded.66 In general, they refer to the idea of compensation in the case of expropriation without using 
the adjective “full” or otherwise referring to the principle of reparation.67 
 
*. If equality therefore takes the form of “fairness” in the expropriation context, this appears to give 
credence to the view derived from the theory above that equality in any momentary instance is merely 
‘fair’. This is true even if equality is ‘greater’ than fairness at a purely conceptual level (equality > 
fairness) since it is something that is constantly worked towards.  
 
*. But what then is the relevant standard of compensation in the case of an expropriation? It is useful 
to note that the language employed in treaties and by tribunals in instances of valuation becomes 
highly specific and contextualized, with use of such terms as “fair market value”, “genuine value”, 
“actual value” and so forth. Moreover, as Irmgard Marboe points out, the idea of value is not objective 
since “[i]t always depends on a specific relationship between the particular object and a subject.”68 
Again, this practice seems to cohere with the relational view of fairness as ‘appropriateness’. What is 
“fair” will depend upon the nature of the relationship, and that, in turn, may involve significant 
discounting or revaluation in light of the particulars of the relationship.  
 
*. Do these same ideas also hold with respect to the valuation of breaches of international law and 
breaches of contract? Superficially they would appear not to. In the leading international case on 
point, The Chorzów Factory, the Permanent Court of International Justice observed: 
 
The essential principle contained in the actual notion of an illegal act – a principle 
which seems to be established by international practice and in particular by decisions 
of arbitral tribunals – is that reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all the 
consequences of the illegal act and re-establish the situation which would, in all 
probability, have existed if that act had not been committed.69   
 
Chorzów Factory has been referred to on numerous occasions since it was first formulated in 1928. 
Additional support for this view would appear to come from the International Law Commission’s 
Draft Articles on State Responsibility (DASR), which were concluded in 2001. DASR Art. 31 states: 
 
The responsible State is under an obligation to make full reparation for the injury 
caused by the internationally wrongful act. 
 
*. These considerations – which involve the law’s normativity and the practical difficulties of making 
full reparation – suggest the ILC formulation tacitly coheres with the view that remediation there will 
be a shortfall in “full reparation”. This lends further support to the view derived from theory that 
equality in the abstract is greater than fairness in reality (equality > fairness). Actual examples from 
                                                 
66 Ibid., p. 21, para. 2.50. 
67 Ibid., p. 22, para. 2.52. 
68 Ibid., p. 22, para. 2.57. See also Paulo Roberto B. Lustosa, “The Fairness of Fair Value: SFAS 157, Irving Fisher and GECON” 
Electronic copy available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1814176 (2011) (Fair value measurement is increasingly spreading in accounting 
standards. In February 2011 the fair value measure was present in 61 FASB pronouncements. Such diffusion led to the issuance of 
SFAS 157 - Fair Value Measurements, in which many prior definitions and measurement requirements, presented in other 
pronouncements, were replaced by a single international accounting standard on this subject. But the expansion of situations in which 
fair value measurement is required makes it more difficult to ensure that the computed measure of value is actually fair.) 
69 Case concerning the Factory at Chorzów, P.C.I.J. 1928 Ser. A. No. 17, 47 (emphasis added). 
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international investment law also tend to support this view.70 
 
b. International Trade Law 
 
*. International trade law might appear similar to international investment law today in the sense that 
it is sourced in thousands of bilateral, regional and multilateral treaties, something which has given 
commentators in recent years cause to complain about a “spaghetti bowl” of diverse obligations.71 
Nevertheless, this diversity masks a degree of uniformity brought about by the membership of most 
major economies in the World Trade Organization (WTO). No similar centralizing set of obliagtions 
exists in the field of international investment.  
 
*. Centralization means that there is a markedly different ‘orientation’, or ‘pitch’, to WTO obligations 
than those found in most international investment agreements. Likewise, the conception of equality is 
more uniform. Whereas international investment law is rights-oriented and largely retrospective in 
nature, WTO law is, on the whole, much more obligation-oriented and more evidently concerned with 
equality going forward. Fairness concerns therefore arise more episodically in WTO law. 
 
*. The law of the WTO Agreement originates in legal arrangements that originally developed under 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of 1947 (GATT 1947). At the time of GATT’s 
conclusion the original vision underlying the treaty was one of equality of treatment, as spelled out in 
GATT Arts. I (Most Favoured Nation obligation) and III (National Treatment obligation). GATT 
members agreed to bind their tariffs at individually agreed levels, or “ceilings”, under GATT Art. II. 
They then supplemented this commitment with a further commitment to treat all foreign goods as well 
as they treated the goods of their most favoured trading partner (the MFN obligation in GATT Art. I) 
and no less favourably than they treated like or similar domestic goods (the NT obligation in GATT 
Art. III). 
 
*. The effect of these arrangements, however, was less rigourous than a pure equality standard might 
suggest. In practice it proved difficult, if not impossible, to accord exactly identical treatment to 
foreign products, meaning that over time the habitual standard of treatment under GATT came to be 
described somewhat more loosely as one of “non-discrimination”. 
 
*. GATT and WTO dispute settlement subsequently made clear that despite the emphasis on 
treatment, GATT/WTO law ultimately aims at “equality of competitive conditions”.72 This aim is to 
be contrasted with a legal system which seeks to guarantee specific trade results. The ultimate end of 
WTO law is much less ambitious and more evidently instrumental. It is that foreign and domestic 
goods should encounter the same competitive environment ab initio in the marketplace.73 
                                                 
70 This ‘downward bias’ is hypothesized from the difficulty of assessment noted in many cases and the fact that most statements of the 
relevant rules are phased restrictively, as for instance U.N. CISG Art. 74 (“Such damages may not exceed the loss which the party in 
breach foresaw or out to have foreseen) and Article 9:502 of the Principles of European Contract Law (defining the ‘General Measure 
of Damages’ as “such sum as will put the aggrieved party as nearly as possible into the position which it would have been if the 
contract had been duly performed.”). Marboe, supra note 65 at p. 31, para. 2.85-87. A distinction is often observed by commentators 
and authorities concerning damage to a state, regulated on the plane of international law, and damage to an individual, regulated by 
private law. In some instances both have been regarded as essentially the same. On DASR Art. 36, for instance, Marboe notes that 
“This general formulation leaves room for interpretation and flexibility. … In essence, [DASR] Art. 36 determines that the damage 
must be ‘financially assessable’. This, however, represents only a very rough guideline, in particular because this provision does not 
only include material but also immaterial damage, which is certainly not financially assessable without difficulties.” Marboe, supra 
note 22 at p. 81, para. 3.116 [emphasis added]. 
71 The term ‘spaghetti bowl’ to describe the diversity of overlapping bilateral, plurilateral and multilateral trade agreements is usually 
traced to Jagdish Bhagwati, who first used the term in “U.S. Trade Policy: The Infatuation with Free Trade Agreements” in Jagdish 
Bhagwati & Anne O. Krueger, The Dangerous Drift to Preferential Trade Agreements (1995). 
72 See, for instance, India – Measures Affecting the Automotive Sector, WT/DS146/R, WT/DS175/R, para. 7.316 (21 December 2001). 
“It is a well established principle under WTO jurisprudence that Article III of the GATT 1994 is to provide equality of competitive 
conditions for imported products in relation to domestic products. …. These competitive conditions are affected even in the absence of 
actual trade flows, wherever the conditions afforded to imported products are such as to affect their competitive opportunities on the 
market.” 
73 The connection between fairness and the potentiality to compete has been described as follows: “Trade law generally, and Article III 
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*. The transition from GATT to the WTO Agreement in 1994 involved the expansion of coverage of 
the basic trade disciplines to cover trade in trade in services as well as trade-related aspects of 
intellectual property. Although the new areas of coverage introduced some interpretative challenges, 
the impulse to equality in the form of equal treatment remained strong. Some equality-related terms 
such as “like”, “substitutable”, “competitive” or “non-discriminatory” were carried over into new 
areas of coverage.74 However, there was also a recognition that the non-quantitative and ever-more 
instrumental aspect of the new disciplines would require novel concepts, hence the development of 
“market access” language in relation to both goods and services, “equivalence” and “mutual 
recognition” in the field of technical barriers, and “harmonization” in relation to sanitary disciplines.75 
Each of these innovations can be regarded as a restatement and reinforcement of the primacy of 
equality within the scheme of the treaty. 
 
*. In the WTO era dispute settlement has also made clear that equality, conceived of primarily as 
equal treatment, remains the major unstated premise in WTO law. It pervades the entire agreement, 
acting as a kind of default to which the law automatically returns in cases of uncertainty.  
 
*. This point was made clear in EC – Tariff Preferences76, which was a dispute brought by India 
against the European Communities (EC) regarding certain benefits extended by the EC to some 
developing countries but not others. The particular issue in question was whether the Enabling Clause, 
by which developed countries are “enabled” to grant developing countries “special and differential 
treatment”, overrode the basic MFN obligation of GATT Art. I and allowed the EC to favour one 
developing country over the other. While the WTO Appellate Body repeated that “the MFN principle 
embodied in Article I:1 is a “cornerstone of the GATT” and “one of the pillars of the WTO trading 
system””77, it also observed that “[i]t is simply unrealistic to assume that … development will be in 
lockstep for all developing countries at once …”.78 Consequently, it found that the Enabling Clause 
permits “preference-granting countries to “respond positively” to “needs” that are not necessarily 
common or shared by all developing countries.”79 Notwithstanding this interpretation, however, the 
WTO Appellate Body concluded by restating the commitment to equality in the following terms: 
 
An interpretation of “non-discriminatory” that does not require the granting of 
“identical tariff preferences” allows not only for GSP schemes providing preferential 
market access to all beneficiaries, but also the possibility of additional preferences 
for developing countries with particular needs, provided that such additional 
preferences are not inconsistent with other provisions of the Enabling Clause, 
including the requirements that such preferences be “generalized” and 
“nonreciprocal”.80     
 
                                                                                                                                                 
in particular, focuses on the promotion of economic opportunities for importers through the elimination of discriminatory 
governmental measures which impair fair international trade. Thus, trade law addresses the issue of the potentiality to compete.” 
Korea – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS75, 84/R, para. 10.81 (26 Jan. 2009) (emphasis added). 
74 See for instance GATS Arts. II:1 (MFN), Art. XVII (NT), TRIPS Arts. 3 (NT), 4 (MFN).  
75 ‘Market access’ in the case of goods means the conditions, tariffs and non-tariff measures agreed by members for the entry of 
specific goods into their markets. In the case of services it takes on the character of a specific provision, GATS Art. XVI, due to the 
fact that countries are allowed to condition their service commitments. It may be made subject to various types of limitations 
enumerated in Article XVI(2). For example, limitations may be imposed on the number of services suppliers, service operations or 
employees in the sector; the value of transactions; the legal form of the service supplier; or the participation of foreign capital. The 
obligation of ‘equivalence’ is provided in TBT Art. 2.7 and requires WTO members to give “positive consideration to accepting as 
equivalent technical regulations of other Members”. ‘Mutual recognition’ is referred to in TBT Art. 6.3, which strongly encourages 
members to enter into negotiations with other WTO members to mutually accept conformity assessment results. Finally, 
‘harmonization’, referred to in SPS Art. 3, is the obligation to establish national sanitary and phytosanitary measures consistent with 
international norms.    
76 European Communities – Conditions for the Granting of Preferences to Developing Countries, WT/DS246/AB/R (7 Apr. 2004). 
77 Ibid., para. 101.  
78 Ibid., para. 160. 
79 Ibid., para. 162. 
80 Ibid., para. 169 (emphasis added). 
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The commitment to equality therefore varies with the particular WTO provision and national measure 
in question.81 
 
*. Despite this, ever since the creation of GATT in 1947 there has been recognition of the need to 
temper the idealism of equal treatment with selective departures that take account of actual 
conditions.82 This is where fairness considerations normally arise. In fact, the Appellate Body’s 
interpretation in EC – Tariff Preferences bears this point out. There, developing countries successfully 
made the point that their development needs were not all the same, and that therefore, the EC could 
differentiate between them. Such tempering can be thought of as “fairness” in the sense that it 
responds to real conditions. The law is not keyed to trade as it is prospectively expected, but in some 
sense as realistically unequal, a fact that must be responded to by action that is “appropriate” in the 
hope of readjusting the underlying trading relationships and maintaining community.  
 
*. Thus, in addition to basic requirements of non-discrimination, GATT included disciplines on anti-
dumping (Art. VI), countervailing duties (Arts. VI and XVI) and safeguards (Art. XIX). In each 
instance, member countries were given the right to depart from liberalization requirements where 
existing conditions of trade do not match those that are initially expected. 
 
*. The key to understanding these “flexibilities” is the idea that they involve a right to depart in some 
way from the broad, generally restrictive, obligations contained in the treaty. The departures introduce 
fairness considerations into the law. The treaty allows such flexibility in recognition of the “reality” 
that countries would never participate in a trading system where equality of competitive conditions 
was eroded by dumped or subsidized goods, or where countries had no options to selective close their 
border in the face of threatened or actual injury from foreign competition.83 In other words, trading 
relationships would be eroded, or never come about at all, if the trading environment as between 
competitors was manifestly “unfair”. Hence, the fairness of anti-dumping, countervailing or safeguard 
action permits appropriate counteraction to preserve the integrity of the trading system and hence the 
community. A number of commentators have recognized this in the way that these rights serve as 
“outs” in particular circumstances, and how in doing so, they serve to build support for trade 
liberalization by assuring limited “safe harbours” for affected interests.84 In this way, the larger project 
of “free” trade is able to move forward. 
 
*. Express references to fairness appear at several points within the WTO Agreement consistent with 
these ideas. These references may be broadly classified as preambular, procedural and substantive. 
 
                                                 
81 For instance, ‘equality-as-identity’ is apparent in GATT Art. I:1 (MFN) and Art. V:2. See Colombia – Ports of Entry, WT/DS366, 
para. 7.402 (Apr. 27, 2009). However, under GATT Art. III:4 equality is expressed as “treatment no less favourable”, meaning the 
treatment may be formally different but still no less favourable, as discussed in Korea – Beef, WT/ DS161, 169/AB/R. para. 137 (Dec. 
11, 2000). Hart also postulated the idea of “approximate equality” as part of the “minimum content” of natural law: H.L.A. Hart, The 
Concept of Law (2nd ed.) 195 (1997). This would appear to confirm the further proviso that equality is not identity (i.e. equality ≠ 
identity), at least not all of the time. 
82 In its original proposals for an international trade organization in 1945 the U.S. put forward the view that: “No government is ready 
to embrace “free trade” in any absolute sense. … Every country has its own kind of [trade] restriction, adapted to its own situation, 
and can hardly be expected to throw off its armor unless the other kinds of armor, employed by other countries, are thrown off at the 
same time. What is needed is a broad and yet detailed agreement, among many nations, dealing at one time with many different sorts 
of government restrictions upon trade, reducing all of them at once on a balanced and equitable basis, and stating rules and principles 
with which the restrictions permitted to remain should be administered.” From “Statement by President Truman and Prime Minister 
Attlee” (Dec. 6, 1945), reprinted in XII Department of State Bulletin 905, 915 (Dec. 9, 1945). 
83 The Appellate Body in Argentina – Footwear noted, for instance, that the fairness considerations in safeguard actions are essentially 
for a defensive purpose: “… it is essential to keep in mind that a safeguard action is a “fair” trade remedy. The application of a 
safeguard measure does not depend upon “unfair” trade actions, as is the case with anti-dumping or countervailing measures. Thus, the 
import restrictions that are imposed on products of exporting Members when a safeguard action is taken must be seen, as we have 
said, as extraordinary. And, when construing the prerequisites for taking such actions, their extraordinary nature must be taken into 
account.” Argentina – Safeguard Measures on Imports of Footwear, WT/DS121/AB/R, para. 94 (14 Dec. 1999). 
84 For description of the way in which built-flexibility has been critical to the survival of GATT and the WTO Agreement see J.H. 
Jackson, World Trade and the Law of GATT 30 (1969); J.H. Jackson, The Jurisprudence of GATT and the WTO 189 (2000); A.F. 
Lowenfeld, International Economic Law 41, 42 (2002). 
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*. To begin with, there are a few preambular references to fairness. For instance, in the preamble of 
the WTO Import Licencing Agreement (ILA) mention is made of “the fair and equitable application 
and administration” of import licencing procedures, procedures that take normally place in the context 
of a particular encounter between an importer and a national customs administration. Here the 
possibility for abusive, and hence unfair, conduct is evident. The ILA attempts to limit this sort of 
behaviour by requiring governments to publish sufficient information for traders so that they can 
know how and why licences are granted. ILA Art. 1(3) also provides that “rules for import licencing 
procedures shall be neutral in application and administered in a fair and equitable manner.” 
 
*. Similarly, the preamble of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture (AA) recalls a long-term objective 
of international negotiations in the field of agriculture being “to establish a fair and market-oriented 
agricultural trading system”. This particular reference has to be understood in light of perceived 
inequity in the existing global framework for agriculture in which developed countries continue to 
subsidize production and suppress developing country export opportunities.85 Again, it is important to 
note how the issue of fairness pits developing countries against developed ones and the particularities 
of this relationship. 
 
*. A second set of fairness considerations in WTO law arises procedurally in administrative 
proceedings, where foreign imports or importers can be the victim of national bias. This bias is often 
an issue in anti-dumping proceeding, where a comparison must be made between the exported price 
and the normal value in the producer’s home market for the purposes of calculating a margin of 
dumping. Thus, for instance, Art. 2.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement provides that in calculating 
margins of dumping “A fair comparison shall be made between the export price and the normal 
value.” The obligation is for national authorities to ensure that assessments of price are made that 
accurately reflect comparable conditions. In EC – Bed Linen a WTO panel had an opportunity to 
expand on comparability in light of the obligation of fairness as follows: 
  
… Read in light of the obligation in the Article 2.4 to make a fair comparison, the 
specific requirements to make comparisons at the same level of trade and at as nearly 
as possible at the same time, and the obligation to make due allowance for 
differences affecting price comparability, the use of the word comparable in Article 
2.4.2 indicates to us that investigating authorities may insure comparability either by 
making necessary adjustments under Article 2.4, or by making comparisons for 
models which are, themselves, comparable.86 
 
The panel’s reference to a comparison “at the same level of trade and at as nearly as possible at the 
same time” speaks to the circumstantial nature of a “fair” assessment. In essence, the treaty requires 
the comparison must be tailored to circumstances that are as close as reasonably possible to original 
conditions in the country of production which are ‘appropriate’. This could be accomplished either by 
one of the methods set out in ADA Art. 2.4 or some comparable model. Because the EC had not done 
so fully, it was found to have breached its obligation. 
 
*. Occasionally, the procedural obligation of fairness in WTO law is something projected into national 
legal systems. Thus in Brazil – Dessicated Coconut, for instance, the Appellate Body observed that: 
 
[b]ecause a countervailing duty is imposed only as a result of a sequence of acts, a 
line had to be drawn, and drawn sharply, to avoid uncertainty, unpredictability and 
                                                 
85 Martin Khor of the Third World Network has observed, “[the WTO Agreement on Agriculture] is imbalanced in many ways. It has 
been fashioned in such a way as to enable developed countries to continue high levels of protection, whilst many developing countries 
have liberalised and their farmers are facing severe and often damaging competition, often from imports artificially cheapened through 
subsidies.” See Martin Khor, “The WTO Agriculture Agreement: Features, Effects, Negotiations and What is at Stake” 1 (n.d.).  
86 European Communities – Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Cotton-Type Bed Linen from India, WT/DS141/R, para. 6.117 (Oct. 
30, 2000). 
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unfairness concerning the rights of states and private parties under the domestic laws 
in force when the WTO Agreement came into effect.87 
 
*. More often, however, issues of fairness are raised in a variety of circumstances arising within WTO 
proceedings themselves.88 Like the duty of fairness in English and continental systems of 
administrative law, these involve situations where specific rights are in play and where the decision in 
question has some particular importance to an individual WTO country as opposed to another.89 Thus 
WTO dispute settlement, which takes place largely according to a bilateral matrix involving a single 
complainant and a single respondent, or small clusters of these, has been described as aimed at 
providing “fair, prompt and effective resolution” of trade disputes.90  
 
*. Within these proceedings the WTO Appellate Body has also referred to a requirement of due 
process. Due process, in turn, has been described as “fundamental to ensuring a fair and orderly 
conduct of dispute settlement proceedings”.91 In Canada – Continued Suspension due process was 
described as guaranteeing “that the proceedings are conducted with fairness and impartiality, and that 
one party is not unfairly disadvantaged with respect to other parties in a dispute.”92 Similarly, in Chile 
– Price Band System the Appellate Body observed that “[a] panel will fail in the duty to respect due 
process if it makes a finding on a matter that is not before it, because it will thereby fail to accord to a 
party a fair right of response.”93 In Canada – Continued Suspension the Appellate Body also observed 
that the allocation of the burden of proof in compliance proceedings was, among other considerations, 
                                                 
87 Brazil – Measures Affecting Dessicated Coconut, WT/DS22/AB/R, p. 19 (Feb. 21, 1997). 
88 Marion Panizzon, “Good Faith, Fairness and Due Process in WTO Dispute Settlement Practice” in Julian Chaisse & Tiziano 
Balmelli (eds), Essays on the Future of the World Trade Organization (Vol. II – The WTO Judicial System: Contributions and 
Challenges) (2008). 
89 In surveying this law of rights/law of fairness it is useful to keep in mind that there is an analogous body of jurisprudence in English 
law and the law of other common law jurisdictions concerning the “duty of fairness” in administrative proceedings: see William Wade 
& Christopher Forsyth, Administrative Law (10th ed.) 402 (2009); David Jones & Anne S. de Villars, Principles of Administrative Law 
(5th ed.) 253 (2009). This body can help to inform and supplement the theory put forward above given that what fundamentally is at 
issue as in many cases of fairness in international economic law is the relationship between government and the individual. In the 
domestic context courts have held that administrative tribunals and bodies owe a duty to be fair – usually conceived of as a duty to 
take into account the specific circumstances of the applicant – whenever the applicant’s rights are specially affected. The duty can be 
thought of as an individualization of the procedure to the applicant, or in other words, an obligation of “appropriateness”. The 
Supreme Court of Canada observed in Baker v. Canada that: 
 
[t]he values underlying the duty of procedural fairness relate to the principle that the individual or individuals 
affected should have the opportunity to present their case fully and fairly, and have decisions affecting their 
rights, interests, or privileges made using a fair, impartial, and open process, appropriate to the statutory, 
institutional, and social context of the decision.  
 
[1999] 2 S.C.R. 817, para. 28. For comment see Grant Huscroft, “From Natural Justice to Fairness – Thresholds, Content and the Role 
of Judicial Review” manuscript available at www.ssrn.com, abstract 2013253 (May 24, 2012).forthcoming in Colleen Flood et al. 
Administrative Law in Context (2nd ed.). Again, the reference to “rights, interests or privileges” and the insistence on particularization 
is especially notable. The passage from Baker speaks of a desire to tailor procedures and outcomes to the specific rights in question, 
thereby affirming the relationship between the state and the claimant. It also speaks to the point that law, which is largely instrumental, 
is best equipped to achieve procedural as opposed to substantive fairness. The same point has been made by other commentators who 
have referred to similar fairness principles developed in the context of European and EU administrative law. See for instance Stephan 
W. Schill, “Fair and Equitable Treatment under Investment Treaties as an Embodiment of the Rule of Law”, IILJ Working Paper 
2006/6. Schill observes that “the rule of law understanding underlying the jurisprudence of investment tribunals can be described as 
primarily procedural and institutional in nature.” Ibid., p. 43. Schill also makes the point that jurisprudence of the European Court of 
Human Rights or under the European Convention on Human Rights “could … be used to further concretize fair and equitable 
treatment, for example, with respect to the timely administration of justice or the right to a fair trial. Similarly, comparative recourse 
could be had to the emerging principles of European administrative law or the jurisprudence of the WTO Appellate Body in order to 
further develop the rule of law requirements with respect to the exercise of public power.” Ibid., p. 34. 
90 The Appellate Body has noted, “The procedural rules of WTO dispute settlement are designed to promote, not the development of 
litigation techniques, but simply the fair, prompt and effective resolution of trade disputes”. United States – Tax Treatment for 
"Foreign Sales Corporations" (“US – FSC”), WT/DS108/AB/R, para. 166 (Feb. 24, 2000) (emphasis added). 
91 Thailand – Anti-Dumping Duties on Angles, Shapes and Sections of Iron or Non-Alloy Steel and H-Beams from Poland, 
WT/DS122/AB/R, para. 88 (March 12, 2001). 
92 Canada – Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC – Hormones Dispute, WT/DS321/AB/R, para. 433 (Oct. 16, 2008). 
93 Chile – Price Band System and Safeguard Measures relating to Certain Agricultural Products, WT/DS207/AB/R, para. 176 (23 
Sept. 2002). 
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a matter of “procedural fairness”.94 And again, in Chile – Price Band System an arbitrator assessing 
the reasonable period of time (RPT) for implementation by Chile noted that the RPT chosen “will 
fairly balance the legitimate needs of the implementing Member against those of the complaining 
Member.”95 Once more, the recurrent issue in fairness involves the characteristics of relationships 
among members and between tribunals and litigating parties. 
 
*. Considerations of substantive fairness are perhaps more pervasive, but less often express and 
therefore harder to identify, in WTO law. I have already referred to the “flexibilities” of WTO law and 
the way in which these give member countries the right to derogate from their obligations in certain 
instances.  
 
*. Another related set of flexibilities that raise fairness considerations in WTO law involve formal 
exceptions. Every legal system must have exceptions that allow for selective release from generalized 
rules. In the case of GATT, for instance, these are found most notably in GATT Art. XX, where 
countries have the right to depart from liberalization requirements in the pursuit of certain defined 
policy objectives. The applicable method of justification is two-fold. First, a country must prove that it 
has met the terms of the relevant exception. Second, it must subsequently prove that it has met the 
terms of GATT Art. XX’s preamble, which the Appellate Body has emphasized focuses attention on 
the application of the measure at issue. The analysis centers on whether there is adequate justification 
for the measure when compared with other, similar situations. 
 
*. Not surprisingly, the invocation of exceptions has led to rigourous analysis of their extent in WTO 
jurisprudence. A number of cases and commentators have pointed out that exceptional behaviour in 
the form of rights must not be allowed to vitiate the rights of other WTO members. Consequently, 
there have been a number of references in case law to doctrines such as abuse of rights, 
proportionality and estoppel that suggest a preoccupation in these instances with definition, 
conditioning and limitation.96 The preoccupation stems directly from the exceptions which, while 
required to respect state sovereignty and to tailor the law to individual circumstances in the manner of 
“fairness”, are not unrestricted. For instance, in interpreting the word “necessary” in GATT Art. 
XX(b) the panel in Brazil – Tyres observed: 
 
The necessity of a measure should be determined through ‘a process of weighing and 
balancing of factors’ which usually includes the assessment of the following three 
factors: the relative importance of interests or values furthered by the challenged 
measures, the contribution of the measure to the realization of the ends pursued by it 
and the restrictive impact of the measure on international commerce.97 
 
*. A further consideration of substantive fairness arises in cases of WTO retaliation where member 
countries are entitled to retaliate against other countries’ breaches of the WTO Agreement. On the 
surface the law appears to mandate an equality standard. Thus, Art. 22.4 of the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Understanding (DSU) provides that: 
 
The level of the suspension of concessions or other obligations …. shall be 
equivalent to the level of the nullification or impairment. 
                                                 
94 Canada – Continued Suspension, supra, note 94 at para. 361. 
95 Chile – Price Band System and Safeguard Measures relating to Certain Agricultural Products (21.3), WT/DS207/13, para. 37 (17 
Mar. 2003). 
96 For instance, in U.S. - Shrimp the Appellate Body observed in relation to the preamble, or chapeau, of Art. XX that “The task of 
interpreting and applying the chapeau is, hence, essentially the delicate one of locating and marking out a line of equilibrium between 
the right of a Member to invoke an exception under Article XX and the rights of the other Members under varying substantive 
provisions (e.g., Article XI) of the GATT 1994, so that neither of the competing rights will cancel out the other and thereby distort and 
nullify or impair the balance of rights and obligations constructed by the Members themselves in that Agreement.” U.S. – Import 
Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R, para. 159 (12 Oct. 1998) (emphasis added). 
97 Brazil – Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, WT/DS332/R, para. 7.104 (12 June 2007). 
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Thus, for instance, in the Bananas dispute between the U.S. and EU, the U.S. was authorized to 
retaliate against the EU in the amount of $201.6 million annually for EC tariff restrictions on foreign 
bananas. The U.S. implemented the retaliation in the form of additional duties on a range of EU 
agricultural products in the period 2000-09 until the dispute was finally settled. Such retaliation is 
temporary and to be invoked “as a last resort”.98 
  
*. Several commentators have pointed out, however, the opacity of the retaliatory equivalence 
standard.99 What exactly is “equivalent to the level of the nullification or impairment” and how is it to 
be implemented? It might seem reasonable to assume that nullification or impairment should be tied to 
the detrimental trade effects of a violation, but even this initial issue is unclear given that the MFN 
obligation infers that a single violation may have multi-directional effects within the trading system. 
Thomas Sebastian has noted that there are potentially four issues arising in an equivalence 
determination: 
 
Arbitrators have to (1) specify the baseline from which they wish to assess the 
detrimental effects of the concerned measures; (2) settle on a metric for measuring 
these effects; (3) determine which detrimental effects will be considered; and (4) 
resolve any empirical issues that may arise.100 
 
Sebastian and others have detailed the arbitrary nature of all of these inquiries and the fact that, taken 
together, the aggregate assessment of them is conceptually unconvincing.  
 
*. Perhaps the greatest complaint of the retaliatory standard is the fact of its limited intensity. Many 
commentators have observed that a strict equivalence standard for retaliation provides no real 
incentive to comply. Sebastian concludes with palpable frustration that: 
 
The search for an instrumental rationale to guide arbitrators leads us to conclude that 
many theories cannot be reconciled with the structure of the remedial provisions of 
the DSU, are not achievable in practice, or are simply incoherent. … It follows that, 
unless one endorses the retribution rationale, one must conclude that the bulk of the 
WTO remedial regime relating to the permissible intensity of retaliation is simply 
bereft of any valid rationale.101 
 
*. Nevertheless, it is useful to consider exactly why an equivalence standard might make sense on the 
theory put forward in this article and how the conclusions of Sebastian and others can be reformulated 
so as to be more logically and naturally understood as instances of “fairness”. 
 
*. My conclusion would appear to be nonsensical if considered in light of the treaty’s plain directive 
that the amount of retaliation should be “equivalent to the level of the nullification or impairment”. 
But it is intelligible if seen against a broader background of the treaty - a background composed of all 
the transactions within series of trading relationships taken together. Shortfalls in the assessment of 
nullification or impairment routinely occur because WTO members expect their relationships to 
continue and are therefore content to contemplate such a result. Like private actors in any 
‘community’, WTO members will be content to accept permission to retaliate for somewhat less or 
more than the damage they have sustained in recognition of an ongoing relationship requiring 
                                                 
98 See DSU Art. 3.7 (“The last resort which this Understanding provides to the Member invoking the dispute settlement procedures is 
the possibility of suspending the application of concessions or other obligations under the covered agreements …”). 
99 See for instance Thomas Sebastian, “World Trade Organization Remedies and the Assessment of Proportionality: Equivalence and 
Appropriateness” 48:2 Harvard  Int’l L.J. 337 (2007) [hereinafter ‘Sebastian’]; Bryan Mercurio, “Retaliatory Trade Measures in the 
WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding: Are there Really Alternatives?” in James C. Hartigan (ed.), Frontiers of Economics and 
Globalization - Vol. 6, 397 (2009) [hereinafter ‘Mercurio’].  
100 Sebastian, ibid., p. 351. 
101 Sebastian, ibid., pp. 378-379. 
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reciprocation in future. The equality language contained in DSU Art. 22.4 is valuable, however, 
because it gives the system a touchstone to aim for. In this sense, the aspiration to equality is 
important for the promotion of community even if it is never fully nor satisfactorily realized.102 
 
*. These illustrations of the tension between notions of equality as an abstract ideal and the 
determination of what is fair in specific circumstances should also help to clarify the overarching 
purpose of WTO remedies and of WTO law. This purpose is manifestly different from that of 
international investment law, which aims to vindicate investor rights for the larger purpose of 
promoting investment flows.103 If we understand the contrasting roles of equality and fairness as 
manifestations of justice, it becomes apparent that the WTO’s remedial system may have a mix of 
conventionally accepted purposes: compensation, coercion, compliance. Chief among these purposes, 
however, is the idea of transformation, something that leads to the modification of legal relationships 
and comports well with the idea that fairness is, ultimately, about their maintenance and the 
maintenance of a community.104 
 
c. International Monetary Law 
 
*. Like both the international regulatory regimes for investment and trade, the current international 
regime for monetary affairs originated at the Bretton Woods Conference of 1944. During the course of 
the conference representatives of member countries signed Articles of Agreement that created the 
International Monetary Fund. 
 
*. The organization’s basic aims are several-fold, but its over-arching objective is to promote the 
stability in the international monetary system and avoid competitive devaluations that contributed to 
the economic and political chaos during the interwar period (1919-39) and eventually led to World 
                                                 
102 Such considerations are perhaps even more apparent in the realm of WTO disciplines on subsidies. The WTO Subsidies Agreement 
(SCM) Art. 3 allows countries to complain against export subsidies, that is, subsidies which are conditioned on exports or on schemes 
of import substitution. In the event that a violation is found, SCM Art. 4.10 provides that the WTO “shall grant authorization to the 
complaining Member to take appropriate countermeasures ….” An accompanying footnote explains that the term “appropriate” “… is 
not meant to allow countermeasures that are disproportionate in light of the fact that the subsidies dealt with under these provisions are 
prohibited.” The standard of “appropriateness” is evidently different from the equivalence standard found in DSU Art. 22.4. In three 
instances arbitrators assessing retaliation under DSU Art. 22.6 have considered this difference in determining what is “appropriate”. 
Thus, in Brazil – Aircraft (Article 22.6) the arbitrators observed that the difference did not require an equality-of-harm approach as is 
normally the case under DSU Art. 22.4 and instead decided that “a countermeasure is appropriate inter alia if it effectively induces 
compliance.” WT/DS46/ARB, para. 3.44 (Aug. 28, 2000). In U.S. – FSC (Article 22.6) the issue was tax credits received by U.S. 
firms for certain overseas operations, something that was found to amount to an export subsidy. Because there was no easy way of 
calculating the exact benefit conferred on U.S. companies, the arbitrators determined that “appropriate” involved the “imposition on 
firms of the Member concerned of expenses at least equivalent to those initially incurred by the treasury of the Member concerned in 
granting benefits to its firms.” U.S. – FSC, WT/DS108/ARB (Aug. 30, 2002). Finally, in Canada – Aircraft (Article 22.6) the 
arbitrators noted that the complainant, Brazil, had failed to substantiate a causal link between the subsidy and the sales lost by a 
Brazilian manufacturer so that the typical equality-of-harm approach could not be usefully applied. In the alternative, the arbitrator 
decided to base “appropriate countermeasures” on the amount of the subsidy conferred, but also added a 20 percent top-up, or 
premium, to this amount in recognition of the fact that Canada has made clear its refusal to withdraw the subsidy. It is noteworthy that 
in coming to their specific conclusion, the arbitrators took into account a number of factors that had the effect of further particularizing 
the relief. See Canada – Aircraft (II), WT/DS222/ARB, para. 3.121 (Feb. 17, 2003). The “individuality of the law” here is apparent. 
103 Again, many commentators have expressed bewilderment at the shape of WTO remedies. Thus, Bryan Mercurio has noted: … the 
system, as written and interpreted, does not have clear aims and objectives (beyond simply resolving the dispute). The question of 
whether the retaliatory phase of the process is designed to rebalance concessions, coerce compliance or punish recalcitrant respondents 
is simply not clearly addressed in the text of the DSU. See Mercurio, supra note 101, p. 431. 
104 In conventional thinking about WTO remedies this is often referred to as “rebalancing.” Sebastian describes rebalancing as follows:  
 
In effect, under this approach arbitrators are being asked to rewrite the WTO Agreements between two WTO 
Member states. But they have no guidance about what the reformulated agreement should look like. To arrive at 
this reformulated agreement they would need to know, at the outset, the precise content of the underlying 
bilateral bargain between the concerned countries. However, this knowledge is simply not attainable. For a 
variety of reasons, an arbitrator has not practical way to determine the “price” paid by State R for State V’s 
commitment to abide by the obligation breached.  
 
Sebastian, supra note 101, p. 371. Sebastian dismisses the rebalancing function as a plausible purpose of WTO remedies because he 
conceives of the relationship between two WTO members, and more broadly and diffusely between the entire membership, in starkly 
empiric terms of a “price” rather than as I do, metaphorically for an entire set of economic, political and social priorities. 
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War II. For this reason, the Articles originally provided for a system of managed exchange rates, or 
“pegs”, tied to gold. Over time the system proved unsustainable, something which led to its 
abandonment and reform in the early 1970s.  
 
*. Since 1977 IMF member countries have essentially been free to set their own exchange rates. This 
freedom can take the form either of a peg, a “managed float”, or a free float, as set out in Art. IV:2(b). 
However the freedom, or right105, is accompanied by an important obligation contained in Art. 
IV:1(iii): 
 
[Each member shall] avoid manipulating exchange rates or the international 
monetary system in order to prevent effective balance of payments adjustment or to 
gain an unfair competitive advantage over other members. 
 
According to Rosa Lastra the obligations spelled out in Art. IV are “rather generic in their formulation 
(‘endeavour to …’, ‘seek to promote …’) with the exception of Article IV, section 1(iii), which 
specifically requests members to”106 avoid currency manipulation for the particular purposes 
mentioned.107 
 
*. Making determinations under Art. IV:1(iii) is problematic. Determining whether a country is 
preventing effective balance of payments adjustments or “seeking to gain an unfair competitive 
advantage over other members” is not easily measured under conventional economic analysis. 
Nevertheless, since the early 2000s the content of the obligation under Art. IV:1(iii) has come to be at 
the centre of a dispute ongoing between the U.S. and China over China’s valuation of its currency, the 
renminbi (RMB). The dispute has arisen in the shadow of a growing U.S.-China trade relationship 
which, by some measures, has become the largest bilateral trade relationship in the world.108 
 
*. The currency dispute between the U.S. and China has simmered for several years and given rise to 
threats of retaliatory legislation in the U.S. Congress.109 Nevertheless, China’s currency continues to 
fuel Chinese exports, which remain attractively priced for foreign buyers, including Americans, 
thereby contributing substantially to the U.S. trade deficit. The result is a steady erosion of the 
competitiveness of non-Chinese producers of many goods. Not surprisingly, many Americans are of 
the view that China’s currency valuation practices are “unfair”. 
 
*. The particular claim to unfairness here arises within the context of the U.S.-China trade 
relationship. To understand the sensitivities it raises, additional background on the functions and 
workings of the IMF are in order. The commitment to equality in IMF operations is a purely legal one. 
                                                 
105 Relationships are classically conceived of in law in terms of rights and obligations. A right “affirms the desiring and hence the 
willing of the right-holder.” The correlative of a right is an obligation, which is said to “constrain[] the willing of the duty-holder.” 
Philip Allott observes that by legal relation in the form of a right, “society is considered to confer on the right-holder the benefit, the 
protection, the assurance, the individuality of the law.” Likewise, by legal relation in the form of an obligation, “society is considered 
to impose on the duty-holder the burden, the order, the universality of the law.” Philip Allott, Eunomia p. 159-160 (¶ 10.43) (1990). 
106 As an example, Lastra mentions the case of Sweden’s violation of the obligation in 1982, but also notes that the IMF Executive 
Board “took no specific formal decision nor imposed any sanction” in that case. Rosa Lastra, Legal Foundations of International 
Monetary Stability 365 (2006). 
107 Ibid., 366. 
108 The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative estimated in 2011 that China was the U.S.’s second largest goods trading partner and 
the largest supplier of U.S. goods imports. See Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, http://www.ustr.gov/countries-regions/china 
(consulted Oct. 12, 2012).  
109 For a summary of proposed retaliatory legislation see Wayne M. Morrison & Marc Labonte, “China’s Currency: An Analysis of the 
Economic Issues” Congressional Research Service Report RS21625 (Jan. 12, 2011). At the same time the U.S. Treasury Department's 
most recent review of global exchange-rate policies, published in May 2012, concluded that China does not meet the criteria to be 
labelled a currency manipulator. Indeed, the Treasury report points out that China's exchange rate is a better reflection of fair value 
than it has been in years – though it maintains the currency distortions remain significant. “China is gradually allowing necessary 
external adjustments to take place, as indicated by the decline in China's current account surplus together with real appreciation of the 
[yuan] since June, 2010, and China's steps to gradually open its capital account,” the report said. “Nevertheless, the underlying factors 
that distort China's economy and constrain global demand growth remain.” See U.S. Treasury, “Semiannual Report on International 
Economic and Exchange Rate Policies” p. 4 (May 2012).  
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It is rooted in the fact that each country has an equal sovereign right to establish its own exchange 
rate.  Formally speaking, there is no notion of “equal compensation” as in international investment law 
or the “equality of competitive conditions” as in WTO law. The international monetary system, which 
is composed of hundreds of exchange rates that fluctuate daily, is reflective of so many diverse forces 
and priorities that it is probably beyond the ability of governments and international financial 
institutions to entirely control. At the same time, governments constantly intervene to support or 
depreciate their currencies.110 
 
*. The prevailing complexity of the international monetary system means the IMF’s primary function 
is chiefly as a ‘surveillance’ institution. This surveillance is carried on annually on a bilateral basis 
with each member country. Surveillance has been described as follows: 
 
The purpose of surveillance is to evaluate the appropriateness of a country’s existing 
policies and at the same time to encourage the country to adopt new policies that 
enhance the smooth functioning of the international monetary system. IMF 
surveillance integrates the bilateral aspects of analyzing the policies of individual 
countries with the multilateral aspects of examining the consequences of these 
policies for the operation of the system as a whole.111  
 
Lastra notes that the conclusions of surveillance reports are only published if a country consents.112 
Thus, apart from the ability of the organization to deny, or at least heavily condition, fulfillment of 
members’ individual requests for assistance from the Fund, there is little that the IMF can do to force a 
country to adopt its prescriptions. Certain countries, like Malaysia during the Asian Financial Crisis of 
1997-98 or Argentina in early 2001, plainly refused to do so, with mixed results. 
 
*. The Fund’s loose normativity means that what has emerged instead is generally recognized to be a 
regime of ‘soft law’, that is, a regime whose norms are non-binding as a legal matter and largely 
aspirational in nature. Lastra notes: 
 
Since Article IV imposes obligations upon members, sanctions can be applied in the 
case of breach of these obligations. However, ‘there has not been a single instance in 
which sanctions have been applied or a report has been made for breach of an 
obligation under Article IV. This de facto transformation of Article IV section 1 into 
a “soft law provision” is reflected in the description of Article IV consultation with 
members as “policy advice” … or “policy dialogue”.”113  
 
*. The basic problem in the U.S.-China currency dispute is therefore one of insufficient normativity. 
Individual country’s rights within the system have not been reconciled and integrated within a 
framework of corresponding obligations. There remains considerable flexibility, or ‘play’, that takes 
the shape of soft law. Here, fairness claims are tenous and often hard to make out. 
 
*. Still, one growing problem in recent decades has been the size of trade surpluses and deficits, 
something recognized as long ago as 1977 as potentially contributing to financial and economic 
instability. Thus, in the IMF Executive Board’s 1977 Decision, “Surveillance over Exchange Rate 
Policies” mention was made of the duty of countries to avoid “manipulating their exchange rates …. 
to gain an unfair competitive advantage over other members” and “Members should take into account 
in their intervention policies the interests of other members”. In 2007 an Executive Board re-iterated 
                                                 
110 China is far from the only country in the world without a free-floating currency, nor is it alone in pulling policy levers that 
influence exchange rates. (Critics have recently suggested the manipulator label could just as easily be applied to Switzerland or Israel 
– or even to the U.S. Federal Reserve Board, for its quantitative easing.) See David Parkinson, “Romney’s View Aside, China Is No 
Currency Manipulator” The [Toronto] Globe & Mail B10 (Nov. 5, 2012).  
111 Rosa Lastra, Legal Foundations of International Monetary Stability 401 (2006).  
112 Ibid., p. 402. 
113 Ibid., p. 402. 
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the first three principles and added the further principle that “[a] member should avoid exchange rate 
policies that result in external instability.”114  
 
*. Thus, it appears that there is growing awareness of the risk, and the attendant “unfairness” to 
trading relationships, of trade surpluses that may promote or aggravate international economic 
instability. This instability was pronounced during the 2000s when China’s trade surplus with the U.S. 
soared due to outsourcing aided by an artificially cheapened Chinese currency. However, leading 
economists have expressed skepticism that a successful claim could be mounted against China either 
at the IMF or under WTO rules. Thus, for instance, Robert Staiger and Alan Sykes conclude: 
 
The real effects of China’s policies are thus potentially quite complex, are not readily 
translated into trade-policy equivalents, and are dependent on the time frame over 
which they are evaluated (because prices are less “sticky” over a longer time frame). 
Accordingly, we are skeptical about many of the policy responses now under 
consideration in Washington both on economic and legal grounds.115  
 
*. Some commentators appear to assert that China is effectively doing nothing wrong. Thus, Bryan 
Mercurio and Florence Leung come to the paradoxical conclusion that while it “is almost beyond 
reasonable doubt” that “the Chinese authorities influence and control the exchange regime … [yet] 
China does not violate its international obligations.”116 However, it is hard to accept this position if 
China’s activities contribute to global economic instability.  
 
*. The term “unfair” contained in Art. IV:1(iii) and the wording of balance and equilibrium that run 
throughout the Articles of Agreement must have some meaning. Simply because they have been 
accorded none to date does not excuse the IMF from coming to some conclusions about them. 
Otherwise, they risk being reduced to mere surplusage. Mercurio and Leung’s analysis of phases like 
“unfair comparative advantage” is deficient because it sidesteps any effort to get at a reasonable 
definition, asserting China’s unfettered “right” to set its exchange rate as it pleases. Tacit recognition 
of this position appears to be the direction that IMF rules are evolving in. Nevertheless, the failure to 
be any more precise about the concept of “fairness” is an indication of an insufficiently developed 
‘community’. 
 
4. Some Concluding Thoughts 
 
*. I have attempted in this article to put forward a definition of fairness and offer an explanation for its 
recurrent importance in human and international economic relations that goes beyond what has been 
provided in existing literature. In short, I have suggested that fairness is synonymous with 
‘appropriateness’.  
 
*. In international economic law the issue of fairness is most closely associated with appropriate 
treatment, which again, I have suggested is undertaken to preserve and strengthen relationships. This 
view coheres with humans’ biologic and evolutionary nature, which depends upon relationships to 
accomplish the increasingly complex tasks that sustain human life. The tremendously sophisticated 
                                                 
114 In 2007 the IMF adopted a new Decision on Bilateral Surveillance over Member’s Policies, PIN No. 07/69 (June 21, 2007) which 
clarifies the concept of exchange rate manipulation. An Annex to the decision makes clear, however, that Art. IV:1(iii) is hard to 
police because in order for an undervalued exchange rate to be inconsistent with Art. IV it must be shown that: 1. The exchange rate is 
manipulated through policies actually affecting the rate, 2. These policies are engaged in for the purpose of fundamental 
misalignment, and 3. The purpose of this misalignment is to increase net exports. Furthermore, any representation made by the 
member regarding the purpose of its policies will be given the benefit of any reasonable doubt. See Catharina Koops, “Manipulating 
the WTO? The Possibilities for Challenging Undervalued Currencies under WTO Rules”, Amsterdam Center for International Law 
2010 Research Paper Series p. 14, manuscript available at www.ssrn.com, abstract 1564093 (2010). 
115 Robert Staiger & Alan Sykes, “Currency Manipulation” and World Trade, manuscript available at www.ssrn.com, abstract 
1151942 (June 13, 2008). 
116 Bryan Mercurio & Celine Leung, “Is China a Currency Manipulator? The Legitimacy of China’s Exchange Rate Regime Under the 
Current International Legal Framework” 43:3 International Lawyer 1257 at 1298 (Fall 2009). 
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networks of production and consumption that have arisen over the last few decades in the form of 
global supply and value chains tend to bear my point out. 
 
*. The definition of fairness as “appropriateness” offers a number of advantages. For one, we no 
longer have to resign ourselves to the fact that “talk about fairness is conceptually muddled.”117 
Rather, we can be much clearer about what fairness involves and more aware of its ultimate function 
as a tool of social cohesion. It is also possible to understand why, for instance, recent protests about 
the unfairness of existing economic arrangements may have taken place in many countries against a 
background of uneven economic growth and increasing economic disparity. What is happening in 
many places is an erosion of community. 
 
*. Fairness considerations are most evident in the law of rights because it is rights-oriented situations 
that most often express “the individuality of the law”.118 Individuality is manifested differently in 
different fields of international economic law and ultimately depends upon the overall ‘orientation’, or 
‘pitch’, of a particular legal system.  
 
*. We have seen, for instance, how the law of international investment appears to be the paradigm of a 
rights’-based system, being as it is a legal system which concentrates its attention on the protection of 
individual investors and their investments. Not surprisingly within this matrix, claims to ‘fair and 
equitable treatment’ are of increasing frequency and may, in fact, be one reason why other 
commentators have often complained about the fragmentary nature of the law is in this field and how 
it fails to display principled coherence.119 In WTO law, by contrast, the law is more obligation-
oriented and generalized, being keyed in most instances to equality-based obligations. Hence, the 
“individuality of the law” is more obscure. Nevertheless, attention to individualism arises in 
preambular references to fairness in the WTO Agreements and in particular WTO rules concerned 
with fair conduct. Finally, in international monetary law the law is chiefly concerned with 
safeguarding a country’s sovereign right to set its own exchange rate. There, the issue of fairness 
arises as a concomitant of the obligation to avoid manipulating exchange rates in order to gain an 
“unfair competitive advantage”. The failure to define how an “unfair competitive advantage” is to be 
determined has so far meant that this particular claim to fairness has not been decided under existing 
rules of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Nevertheless, in an increasingly interdependent 
world, one marked by ever-more intensive economic relationships, competing claims to fairness 
suggest no right is absolute and IMF rules appear gradually to be evolving in the direction of greater 
obligation. 
 
*. From the above analysis it becomes possible to represent a theory of fairness within a larger theory 
of justice as follows: 
 
Justice = Equality + Fairness 
 
*. However, as we have also seen, this basic relationship is accompanied by a series of key provisos: 
 
(1) Equality > Fairness 
 
(2) Equality ≠ Fairness 
 
(3) Equality ≠ Identity 
 
                                                 
117 Mathias Risse, “Fairness in Trade” 2 (Working Paper, Feb. 5, 2005). 
118 Philip Allott, Eunomia p. 159-160 (¶ 10.43) (1990). 
119 “[M]any critical voices have deplored the lack of predictability and balance of investment arbitration …” August Reinisch, “The 
Future of Investment Arbitration” in Christina Binder et al. (eds), International Investment Law for the 21st Century, 894 at 916 
(2009). 
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*. Rules of international economic law reveal a preoccupation with fairness that is roughly consistent 
with the theoretical view put forward above. Fairness involves “the justice of particular situations”. It 
is therefore no surprise that particular relationships between economic actors (e.g. the WTO 
membership), between specific countries (e.g. the U.S. and China), between groups of countries (e.g. 
developing and developed) or between institutions and litigants (e.g. investment tribunals and 
claimants) should raise fairness claims in international economic law. It is here that the “individuality 
of the law” is most clearly and forcefully apparent.  
 
*. I have labelled fairness in this article ‘appropriateness’, or “the justice of the particular”. In closing 
it bears thinking about this definition in connection with the Occupy Movement mentioned in passing 
at the outset. As mentioned, Occupy's chief claim is with respect to the fairness (or unfairness) of 
existing social arrangements in many countries, and in particular, growing income in equality. In this 
connection, we can ask how a “justice of the particular” can be applied to a condition of growing 
income disparity that is society-wide. Isn’t this, in some sense, a mismatch? 
 
*. In answering this question it is important to remember that fairness is a property of relationships. 
The idea that motivates so much concern today, and that has sparked protests under the banner of 
Occupy, involves the relationship of individuals to the community at large. Since the Second World 
War this relationship has been conceived of as one which allows, if not promises, a degree of social 
mobility from one generation to the next. That promise is now under threat in many countries as a 
majority of individuals and families find themselves stagnating in terms of opportunities while a small 
minority advance. This is where the idea of fairness resonates. What is ‘appropriate’ is being 
challenged, with the attendant challenge that this presents to the basic framework of human relations 
underlying society, or ‘community’. 
 
*. A metaphoric description to what is happening might be that fairness is characteristic of parts of a 
whole, rather than the whole itself. In this sense, the examination above tends to confirm the 
observation made earlier that fairness would probably make a poor rule for human behaviour in every 
instance. Our behaviour has adapted to this imperative by evolving towards equality, which remains 
an aspirational and largely unfinished project in any human community.  
 
*. During the U.S. Civil War Abraham Lincoln recognized this very point when he attempted to 
reconcile references that “all men are created equal” in the U.S. Declaration of Independence with the 
actual state of race relations at that time. One of Lincoln’s biographers has observed: 
 
When the authors of the Declaration spoke of equality, Lincoln insisted, “they did 
not mean to assert the obvious untruth, that all were then actually enjoying that 
equality. …. They meant to set up a standard maxim for free society, which should 
be familiar to all, revered by all; constantly looked to, constantly laboured for, and 
even though never perfectly attained, constantly approximated, and thereby 
constantly spreading and deepening its influence, and augmenting the happiness and 
value of life to all people of all colours everywhere.”120     
 
Lincoln’s response emphasizes the way in which equality is generalized and immanent, yet always 
incomplete and unfinished. In this respect, it is something that a sustainable community is constantly 
working towards. Equality will form the basis of the community’s political affiliation, but beyond 
that, it is inequality, with its attendant considerations of fairness, that binds people and countries 
together.121 
                                                 
120 Doris Kearns Goodwin, Team of Rivals 207 (2005). 
121 A polis “is composed of unalike elements,” that is to say, of individuals who have many different relations to one another – as man 
and wife, parent and child, soldier and civilian, ruler and ruled – and who engage in many different occupations, “which enables them 
to serve as complements to one another, and to attain a higher and better life by the mutual exchange of their different services.” There 
cannot then “be a single excellence common to all the citizens, any more than there can be a single excellence common to the leader 
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of a dramatic chorus and his assistants … It is as if you were to turn harmony into mere unison, or to reduce a theme to a single beat.” 
Shirley Robin Letwin, On the History of the Ideal of Law (Noel B. Reynolds ed.) 22 (2005). 
